Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2022

Unjustly Vilified TRIPS-Plus?: Intellectual Property Law in Free
Trade Agreements
Marketa Trimble

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

UNJUSTLY VILIFIED TRIPS-PLUS?:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
MARKETA TRIMBLE*
ABSTRACT
Intellectual property (IP) law provisions of free trade agreements (FTAs) have
attracted much criticism. Critics have argued that FTA negotiators, succumbing
to the lobbying of various stakeholders, have eliminated or significantly limited
many of the flexibilities that multilateral treaties had created, forced stronger IP
protection onto developing countries, and fragmented international IP law. While
agreeing with a great deal of the criticism expressed by others, this Article departs
from the typical vilification of FTAs by identifying and analyzing the positive
features of FTA IP provisions that are worth replicating and expanding in future
FTAs. These positive features include provisions concerning the transparency of IP
systems, cooperation among national IP offices, and clarifications of multilateral IP
treaties. The processes of FTA negotiations, adoption, and implementation may
produce positives as well; FTAs provide opportunities for experimentation at the
bilateral and regional level, whose results may usefully inform future multilateral
negotiations. Cross-border IP issues, which can benefit from international
coordination, can also be a focus area in future FTA negotiations.
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INTRODUCTION
Free trade agreements (FTAs) have become an important locus of
international intellectual property (IP) lawmaking at the bilateral and
regional levels. As of January 22, 2021, there were 337 regional trade
agreements in force notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO);
of the 337 agreements, 211 included one or more provisions
concerning IP law (“FTA IP provisions”).1 Of the 211 FTAs with IP
1. The statistic is based on a search conducted on January 21, 2021, in the WTO’s
Regional Trade Agreements Database. Regional Trade Agreements Database, WTO,
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provisions, 45% have entered into force since January 1, 2010,2 and the
FTA numbers and their surge appear striking, particularly when
compared to the outcomes of multilateral IP treaty negotiations;
multilateral treaty-making in the area of IP law has produced only two
international treaties since January 1, 2010.3
FTAs, most of which build on the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS)4 and form the
complicated TRIPS-plus regime, have attracted much criticism for
their IP law provisions. The literature that is critical of FTA IP
provisions is voluminous and its arguments compelling, and its readers
might conclude that there is little, if anything, positive about the role
of FTAs in IP law.5 In response to the critical literature, this Article
searches for “pluses” in the TRIPS-plus development, identifies positive
features of FTA IP provisions, and suggests how these types of features
may be beneficial now and in the future.

https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByCr.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LZ2D-27TJ]
[hereinafter RTAs Database]. According to its User Guide, “[t]he Regional Trade
Agreements Database is a comprehensive database of all RTAs notified to the
GATT/WTO.” Regional Trade Agreements Database User Guide, WTO 4, https://rtais.wto.org/
UserGuide/User%20Guide_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q9N-BSQL] [hereinafter User
Guide].
The 211 FTAs are from 292 regional trade agreements (RTAs) that the WTO
database classifies by the content of the agreement provisions. According to the glossary to
the database, the database does not classify FTAs as having particular provisions, such as IP
provisions, if they fall into one of the following two categories: “(i) all accessions to existing
RTAs, which while notified separately to the WTO, are not treated as having different
provisions from the original RTA; and (ii) certain agreements involving the
Commonwealth of Independent States countries which are due to become inactive.” RTA
Provisions Glossary, WTO, https://rtais.wto.org/USERGUIDE/Glossary_MT_Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8UT-KLJP].
2. RTAs Database, supra note 1.
3. Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, June 24, 2012, U.N.T.S. No.
56432 (entered into force Apr. 28, 2020); Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to
Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print
Disabled, June 27, 2013, U.N.T.S. No. 54134 (entered into force Sept. 30, 2016).
4. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
5. For a rare critical view of the literature that is critical of FTA IP provisions see
Joseph Straus, TRIPS, TRIPS-Plus Oder TRIPS-Minus—Zur Zukunft des Internationalen
Schutzes des Geistigen Eigentums [TRIPS, TRIPS-Plus or TRIPS-Minus—On the Future of
International Protection of Intellectual Property], in PERSPEKTIVEN DES GEISTIGEN
EIGENTUMS UND WETTBEWERBSRECHTS [PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
COMPETITION LAW] 197–212 (Ansgar Ohly et al. eds., 2005). Straus has even identified
some TRIPS-minus developments. Id. at 208–09.
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There are at least two reasons for which a review of the positive
features of FTA IP provisions is warranted. First, given the
overwhelming condemnation of the provisions, it seems appropriate
to present a legitimate alternative view. The analysis and examples
provided in this Article are unlikely to persuade the most adamant
critics of FTAs and FTA IP provisions, but the review may contribute to
a balanced consideration of the treatment of IP law in existing FTAs,
which has attracted much criticism and relatively little praise.
The second reason to review the provisions while focusing on their
positive features is to offer lessons that might be helpful in the future.
As the United States emerges from its retreat to unilateralism and
“engage[s] with the world once again,”6 it is important to revisit the
role of FTAs in international relations, suggest where and how existing
FTAs might be beneficial to IP law, and identify tools that might be
useful in future FTAs, which could be negotiated to enhance positive
goals through IP law.7
Critics might accuse this Article of cherry picking. An evaluation of
the effects of FTA IP provisions depends on audience; provisions that
are beneficial to one country might be disadvantageous to another
6. Joseph R. Biden Jr., U.S. President, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2021),
(transcript
available
in
the
White
House
Briefing
Room
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/
inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr [https://perma.cc/3CKA-XWX4]).
For an article suggesting that the U.S. administration is taking a cautious approach to
future trade agreements see Thomas L. Friedman, Biden Made Sure “Trump Is Not Going
to Be President for Four More Years,” N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/opinion/biden-interview-mcconnell-chinairan.html [https://perma.cc/GAQ8-CDB4], which quotes President Biden.
7. Cf. 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 175 (2d ed. 2005)
(predicting an eventual return to multilateralism). For examples of other prospectivelooking analyses of FTAs see MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.,
PRINCIPLES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS (2013) [hereinafter MPI PRINCIPLES], https://
www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/forschung_aktuell/06_principles
_for_intellectua/principles_for_ip_provisions_in_bilateral_and_regional_
agreements_final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AHX-KCFQ]; Anke Moerland, Do
Developing Countries Have a Say? Bilateral and Regional Intellectual Property Negotiations with
the EU, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 760, 761 (2017) (suggesting “how
[developing countries] should best address negotiations”); Caroline Ncube et al., A
Principled Approach to Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in the African Continental
Free Trade Agreement, in INCLUSIVE TRADE IN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE
TRADE AREA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 177–94 (David Luke & Jamie Macleod eds.,
2019).
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country. What makes any evaluation even more complex is that the
effects and the perceptions of the effects also vary by stakeholders—what
is positive to some stakeholders might be negative to others.8
Additionally, the effects of FTAs extend beyond the parties to
particular FTAs, which makes any definitive value judgment yet more
difficult. In the end, there might be only a few provisions in any FTA
that are objectively and unequivocally good for everyone.
This Article begins with an overview and typology of existing FTA IP
provisions and an explanation of their significance for national and
international IP law. The first Section on typology and significance is
followed by a review of some of the most notable criticisms of the role
of FTAs in the development of IP law and of the effects that FTA IP
provisions have had in various countries. This Article then addresses
the challenges of identifying the positive features of TRIPS-plus
developments and reviews selected features of FTA IP provisions that

8. Some empirical studies have attempted to show the effects of FTA IP provisions
on economic development; generally, the results have been inconclusive. See, e.g.,
MAXIMILIANO SANTA CRUZ S., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN EUROPEAN UNION
TRADE
AGREEMENTS
vii
(2007),
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/
read/23494699/intellectual-property-provisions-in-european-union-iprsonlineorg
[https://perma.cc/8K6E-BC36] (“Empirical evidence on the role of intellectual
property protection in promoting innovation and growth remains inconclusive.
Diverging views also persist on the impacts of IPRs on development prospects.”); JeanFrederic Morin et al., Having Faith in IP: Empirical Evidence of IP Conversions, 3 WIPO J.
93, 99 (2011); Taleb Awad Warrad, The Economic Impact of the TRIPS-Plus Provision on the
Jordan–United States Free Trade Agreement, in 4 WIPO–WTO COLLOQUIUM PAPERS 45, 45–56
(2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/colloquium_papers_e/2013/
chapter_6_2013_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZTJ-T4TX]; Raymundo Valdés & Maegan
McCann, Intellectual Property Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Revision and Update,
6 fol., 40 (WTO, Working Paper No. ERSD-2014-14, 2014), https://www.wtoilibrary.org/content/papers/25189808/169/read [https://perma.cc/4RH5-V2Z7]
(“The assessment of the economic impact of deep integration RTAs, including those
containing IP provisions, has proved to be difficult.”); Sami Rezgui, Preferential Trade
Agreements, IPR Constraints and Fair Solutions: Case of the European Union–Tunisia Trade
Agreements, in 7 WIPO–WTO COLLOQUIUM PAPERS 75, 80 (2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/colloquium_papers_e/2016/chapter
_9_2016_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/8829-3YSZ] (“Based on these empirical findings, it
is reasonable to say that the impact of IPR regulation on local innovative efforts and
capabilities does not seem to be evident, at least in the short run.”); Piergiuseppe
Pusceddu, Assessing Access to Medicines in Preferential Trade Agreements: From the TransPacific Partnership to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1048, 1074–75 (2018) (citing
several studies on the unclear effects of “enhanced IP protection in developing
countries”).
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might be considered pluses in TRIPS-plus developments. Finally, this
Article highlights the benefits that may stem not only from particular
FTA IP provisions reviewed herein, but also from the processes of
negotiation, adoption, implementation, and assessment of FTA IP
provisions.
Although this Article takes an optimistic approach to FTA IP
provisions while considering the positives in TRIPS-plus developments,
this Article is not a wholesale endorsement of the developments. Many
criticisms are warranted, and it is impossible not to share many serious
concerns about TRIPS-plus developments. Nevertheless, just as a
wholesale endorsement is not appropriate, neither is a wholesale
vilification of the developments. This Article contributes to the
extensive literature on TRIPS-plus by adding some pixels into the
complex picture of TRIPS-plus.9
I. THE TYPOLOGY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FTA IP PROVISIONS
FTA IP provisions exist in a variety of scopes, coverages, and depths,
and consequently significantly vary in their lengths. The first Section
of this Part gives a high-level overview of FTAs with IP provisions,
including their timing (the year an FTA was signed) and their
signatories (the countries and organizations that signed the FTAs),
and offers a categorization of FTAs based on their IP law content. Some
of the FTA IP provisions are discussed further and in much greater
detail in Part III, below, but it is helpful to begin by surveying the
relevant FTA landscape before introducing, in Part II, some of the
major criticisms of FTA IP provisions. Criticisms of the provisions raise
serious concerns the weight of which becomes apparent in Section B
of this Part, which explains the significance of FTA IP provisions for
national and international IP law.
A. The Typology of Existing FTA IP Provisions
FTA IP provisions exist in bilateral and regional trade agreements.10
The WTO database that collects information about all trade
agreements notified to the WTO refers to them as “regional trade
9. This Article does not endeavor to provide comprehensive guidelines for an
FTA negotiations strategy. For negotiation recommendations see MPI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 7, Part 2.
10. The terminology could include plurilateral agreements, but for simplification
this Article uses the terms bilateral and regional agreements with the intention of
including all FTAs with IP law provisions.
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agreements” (RTAs). Technically, FTAs are only one type of RTAs;
other types of RTAs that parties notify to the WTO are customs unions,
economic integration agreements, and “partial scope” agreements.11
For simplification, this Article refers to all these agreements as FTAs.12
The oldest FTA that the WTO database identifies as including IP law
provisions is the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC
Treaty), but its label as the oldest FTA with IP provisions is somewhat
misleading. Today it is clear that the EU powers cover IP matters; the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)13 expressly
refers to IP in three of its articles,14 and the volume of EU secondary
legislation on IP law15 leaves little doubt that IP rights are within the
scope of the TFEU, which provides legal bases for the adoption of
secondary legislation.16 Whether a legal basis existed for IP legislation
in the founding treaties was not always clear; from the beginning,
Article 30 of the 1957 EC Treaty listed the protection of industrial
property as a justification for possible prohibitions of or restrictions on
imports, exports, or transit of goods, but the Treaty did not state
specifically that the European Community had authority in IP matters.
In its decisions from the 1970s and 1980s, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities confirmed that EC rules on competition and

11. User Guide, supra note 1, at 2.
12. The FTA typology presented in this Article is similar to the typology offered by
Azmi in Ida Madieha bt. Abdul Ghani Azmi, The Intellectual Property Dimension of Bilateral
and Regional Agreements in Asia: Implications for Trade and Development Policy, 8 WIPO–
WTO COLLOQUIUM PAPERS 42, 44 (Asian ed. 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/colloquium_papers_e/2017_asian/chapter_5_2017_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UGB-579W]. For an example of a different FTA IP provision
typology and a more granular FTA IP provision overview (from 2014) see Valdés &
McCann, supra note 8, at 6 fol.
13. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT [https://perma.cc/AU62-N6W9].
14. Id. art. 118 (on uniform protection of IP rights); id. art. 207 (on the common
commercial policy); id. art. 262 (on the conferral of jurisdiction in EU IP matters).
15. The primary types of secondary EU legislation on IP law are directives and
regulations. See id. art. 288.
16. Cf. Case C-146/13, Spain v. Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:2015:298, ¶¶ 33–53 (May
5, 2015) (addressing an alleged lack of legal bases for EU legislation concerning the
EU patent with unitary effect); Case C-147/13, Spain v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:299,
¶¶ 65–75 (May 5, 2015) (same).
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free movement of goods affected the exercise of IP rights,17 but it was
only in 1993 that the Court of Justice held that IP rights, specifically
copyright and related rights, “fall within the scope of application of the
Treaty.”18
Leaving aside examples that are similar to the EC Treaty, such as the
Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, which
originally had no IP law provision but later added one,19 the oldest FTA
in the WTO database that includes an IP law provision is the Israel-U.S.
FTA, which was signed in and entered into force in 1985.20 Article 14
of this FTA is an example of one of the most compact FTA IP
provisions; the article reaffirms the parties’ IP law-related obligations
under other agreements and their adherence to the principles of
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment.21
17. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SBGroßmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 498–500, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61970CJ0078&qid=1611337573595
[https://perma.cc/4YCE-K4YS]; Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb membran
GmbH & K-tel Int’l v. GEMA—Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und
mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte, 1981 E.C.R. 147, 166–67, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61980CJ0055&qid=1611337573595
[https://perma.cc/C6PT-SAS9]; Case 7/82, Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von
Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (GVL) v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 483, 504–09, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61982CJ0007&qid=1611337573595
[https://perma.cc/92XY-3RLM]; Case C-341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Imund Export, 1989 E.C.R. 79, 95–97, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61987CJ0341&qid=1611337573595
[https://perma.cc/5YQY-UH88].
18. Joined Cases C-92 & C-326/92, Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH,
1993 E.C.R. I-5145, I-5180, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=
ADC404CC8D9178F7E3E3695CDB9416C8?text=&docid=98462&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1053934 [https://perma.cc/CQ9W-CXHY].
19. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960,
370 U.N.T.S. 3, https://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/documents/legal-texts/eftaconvention/Vaduz%20Convention%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QLSYTKH]. The current Convention includes Article 19 on the Protection of Intellectual
Property. See the consolidated version of the Convention available at
https://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/documents/legal-texts/eftaconvention/Vaduz%20Convention%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C4N-V8S7].
20. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Isr.-U.S., Apr. 22, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 653 [hereinafter Israel-U.S. FTA].
21. Id. art. 14. The provision also specifies the IP rights to which the principles
apply, but does so very broadly, including copyrights and “industrial property of all
kinds.” Id. The commitment to the most-favored-nation principle in this FTA predated
the introduction of the principle into international IP law by TRIPS Article 4. TRIPS,
supra note 4, art. 4.
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The literature that is critical of FTA IP provisions understandably
focuses on FTAs that include elaborate IP law chapters or longer IP law
sections, but it is important to recognize, in the interest of providing a
full picture of the FTA landscape, that about half of the 211 FTAs with
IP provisions that have been notified to the WTO either include no
IP-specific provisions (and only mention IP rights in provisions that
cover multiple areas of law)22 or have only one or a few articles devoted
specifically to IP rights.23 The articles range from minimalistic—such as
a “rendez-vous clause” in which countries simply agree to negotiate
various matters, including IP matters24—to highly elaborate—such as
Article 31 of the EU-Turkey FTA, which refers further to an annex to
the FTA that lists international IP treaties to which Turkey agrees to
accede and EU legislation that Turkey agrees to approximate in its
domestic legislation.25
Some of the FTAs with a single IP article were concluded before
TRIPS was negotiated (TRIPS was signed in 1994). In addition to the
Israel-U.S. FTA mentioned above, FTAs with a single IP article that
predate TRIPS are FTAs that the European Free Trade Association

22. See, e.g., Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Among Japan
and Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, art. 53(c), opened for
signature Mar. 26, 2008, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/asean/agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4B6-3WFY] (including mention of intellectual property within an
article more broadly focused on economic cooperation).
23. It is important to recognize a clear limitation of this statistical approach to
FTAs: the effects of FTAs that are concluded with countries with small economies
cannot be compared to the effects of the more substantial FTAs that are concluded
among countries with large economies.
24. Economic Partnership Agreement, Kenya-U.K., art. 3(b)(iv), Dec. 8, 2020,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/945516/MS_9.2020_Economic_Partnership_Agreement_UK_Keny
a_Member_of_East_Africa_Community.pdf [https://perma.cc/495X-JLA3].
25. Decision No. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995
on Implementing the Final Phase of the Customs Unions, art. 31, Dec. 22, 1995, 1996
O.J. (L 35) 1 [hereinafter EU-Turkey FTA] (referring to Annex 8 on the protection of
intellectual, industrial and commercial property); see also, e.g., Stabilisation and
Association Agreement Between the European Communities and Their Member
States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Albania, of the Other Part, art. 73(1), June
12, 2006, 2009 O.J. (L 107) 166 (referring to Annex V on intellectual, industrial, and
commercial property rights); Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an
Association Between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One
Part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the Other Part, art. 37(1), June 25, 2001, 2004
O.J. (L 304) 39 (referring to Annex VI on intellectual property rights).
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(EFTA) concluded with Turkey and Israel26 and the Faroe Islands-Norway
FTA.27 Many more FTAs with a single IP article postdate TRIPS,
including numerous FTAs that the European Union and the EFTA
signed with multiple countries between 1995 and 2016.28
Although about half of all FTAs with a single IP article were
concluded by either the European Union or the EFTA, such provisions
do not appear only in FTAs with at least one traditional promoter of
IP protection. Turkey also entered into FTAs with a single IP article with
multiple countries (these FTAs were signed between 1995 and 2014)29

26. Agreement Between the European Free Trade Association Countries and
Turkey Relating to Trade, art. 15, Dec. 10, 1991, 1740 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement Between
the European Free Trade Association Countries and Israel Relating to Trade, art. 15,
Sept. 17, 1992, 1741 U.N.T.S. 3.
27. Agreement on Free Trade, Faroe Is.-Nor., art. 17, Sept. 1, 1992, WTO Doc.
WT/REG25/1. The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement refers to IP rights in the
general provision on non-discrimination. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, art.
8(d), Feb. 26, 2009, https://investasean.asean.org/files/upload/Doc%2002%20%20ATIGA.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8PY-MT5J].
28. For examples of EU FTAs see Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an
Association Between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the
One Part, and Arab Republic of Tunisia, of the Other Part, art. 39, July 17, 1995, 1998
O.J. (L 97) 2; Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation Between the
European Community and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of
South Africa, of the Other Part, art. 46, Oct. 11, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 311) 3; Economic
Partnership Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the
One Part, and the SADC EPA States, of the Other Part, art. 16, June 10, 2016, 2016
O.J. (L 250) 3. For examples of EFTA FTAs see Agreement Between the EFTA States and the
Kingdom of Morocco, art. 16, June 19, 1997, https://www.efta.int/media/documents/legaltexts/free-trade-relations/morocco/EFTAMorocco%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement%20EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24EK-FT7T];
Free Trade Agreement Between the EFTA States and the United Mexican States, art. 69, Nov.
27,
2000,
https://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/free-traderelations/mexico/EFTA-Mexico%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AZ2C-3YAD]; Free Trade Agreement Between the EFTA States and the
Republic of Chile, art. 46, June 26, 2003, https://www.efta.int/media/documents/legaltexts/free-trade-relations/chile/EFTA-Chile%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FBZ-BJ9P]; Free Trade Agreement Between the EFTA States and the
Philippines, art. 8, Apr. 28, 2016, https://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/documents/legaltexts/free-trade-relations/philippines/EFTA-Philippines-Rectification-Main-Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KT3U-K6YJ].
29. See, e.g., EU-Turkey FTA, supra note 25, art. 31; Free Trade Agreement,
Malay.-Turk.,
art.
9.12,
Apr.
17,
2014,
https://fta.miti.gov.my/mitifta/resources/Malaysia%20-%20Turkey/MTFTA_Main_Agreement.pdf
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and single IP articles also appear, for example, in the Treaty for the
Establishment of the East African Community,30 the Russia-Serbia FTA,31
and the Agadir Agreement among the Arab Mediterranean countries.32
More elaborate FTA IP provisions have been arranged into brief
sections or chapters on IP rights, and about 20% of the 211 FTAs
include such brief chapters.33 The chapters comprise from two to
several articles that specifically address IP rights, but even though they
are more extensive than the single IP articles in the previous category,
the chapters do not approximate TRIPS in terms of scope and length.
In addition to the 1992 Protocol 28 of the European Economic Area
Agreement, which addresses IP matters in nine articles, the FTAs with
such brief chapters span the period between 1996 and 2019, and
include the Canada-Israel FTA,34 the Australia-Thailand FTA,35 the

[https://perma.cc/2HE3-4XAU]; Free Trade Agreement, Mold.-Turk., art. 15, Sept.
11, 2014, https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-agreements/moldova [https://
perma.cc/WT2P-E5LU]; Agreement on Trade in Goods, S. Kor.-Turk., art. 3.14(4),
Aug. 1, 2012, https://www.customs.go.kr/download/engportal/han_turkey_02_02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96CZ-C9W4] (including a provision concerning IP within an
article on customs cooperation).
30. Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, art. 103(1)(i),
Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255.
31. Agreement on Free Trade, Russ.-Serb., art. 12, Aug. 28, 2000,
https://findrulesoforigin.org/documents/pdf/itc00525_full.pdf.
32. Agreement Setting Up a Free Trade Area Between the Arab Mediterranean
Countries, art. 22, Feb. 25, 2004, http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/583/TOA/
English/ToA.pdf?msclkid=ba79d49db47411ecbeb87b29fb372924www.agadiragreeme
nt.org/EchoBusV3.0/SystemAssets/PDFs/EN/aghadirtext/Agadir%20Agreement%
20Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RMB-6YLK].
33. This Article does not adopt an exact criterion, such as a number of words, to
determine which FTA IP provisions are in which of the three categories identified by
the Article. Therefore, the numbers of FTAs in each of the three categories are
approximate. The Author includes in the category of brief chapter FTAs the JapanMexico FTA, which does not have a brief IP chapter but has three IP provisions in
different parts of the treaty. See Agreement for the Strengthening of the Economic
Partnership, Japan-Mex., arts. 8, 73, 144, Sept. 17, 2004, 2768 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Japan-Mexico FTA].
34. Free
Trade
Agreement,
Can.-Isr.,
ch.
10,
July
31,
1996,
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/israel/fta-ale/text-texte/10.aspx?lang=eng
[https://perma.cc/EEG3-W2GJ] [hereinafter Canada-Israel FTA].
35. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Thai., ch. 13, July 5, 2004,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/2689/download [https://perma.cc/3MZV-ZWVB] [hereinafter AustraliaThailand FTA].
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India-Korea FTA,36 and the China-Mauritius FTA.37 Another example
is a brief section on IP in the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic
Union;38 the IP chapter in the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA is
more extensive but can perhaps still be classified as a brief chapter.39
The remaining 30% of the 211 FTAs feature detailed IP chapters
that go far beyond a simple reaffirmation of the national treatment
principle and countries’ commitments under international treaties. A
detailed IP chapter was in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which was signed in 1992 but replaced by the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
FTA (USMCA), which was signed in 2018 and came into force in 2020.40
Other early detailed FTA IP chapters are in Mexico’s FTAs with
Colombia and with Chile from 1994 and 1998, respectively.41 About
39% of the FTAs with detailed IP chapters that are in force were signed
in 2000–2009; the majority—about 58%—were signed since January 1,
2010.
Fifty-eight percent of FTAs with detailed IP chapters were concluded
by the United States, Japan, or the European Union;42 Mexico,
36. Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, India-S. Kor., ch. 12, Aug.
7, 2009, https://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/India%20Korea%20CEPA%2007.08.2009.pdf
[hereinafter India-Korea FTA].
37. Free Trade Agreement, China-Mauritius, ch. 10, Oct. 17, 2019,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/6074/download [https://perma.cc/LR7G-V8U2] [hereinafter China-Mauritius
FTA].
38. Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, sec. 23, May 29, 2014,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/kaz_e/WTACCKAZ85_LEG_1.pdf
[hereinafter TEEU].
39. Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area,
ch. 13, Feb. 27, 2009, 2672 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand
FTA].
40. NAFTA is not included in the 211 FTAs currently in force; it was replaced by
the USMCA.
41. Tratado de Libre Comercio Entre la Republica de Colombia, la Republica de
Venezuela y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Free Trade Agreement Between the
Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Venezuela, and the United Mexican States],
ch. 18, June 13, 1994, https://www.tlc.gov.co/getattachment/acuerdos/vigente/
tratado-de-libre-comercio-entre-los-estados-unidos/importante/normatividad/ley-172-del-20de-diciembre-de-1994/ley-172-del-20-de-diciembre-de-1994.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM6UY572]; Tratado de Libre Comercio [Free Trade Agreement], Chile-Mex., ch. 15, Apr.
17, 1998, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/chmefta/text_s.asp [https://perma.cc/
895G-8GQW] [hereinafter Chile-Mexico FTA].
42. On the European Union’s preference before 2007 for a “‘simple’ structure of
[its FTA] IP chapters” and a possible “turning point in its approach” see SANTA CRUZ
S., supra note 8, at ix, 1, 18 fol.
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Colombia, Australia, Peru, and Korea all signed six or more such FTAs.
The U.S. preference for extensive treatment of IP rights is apparent in
U.S.-concluded FTAs; only one of the U.S. FTAs currently in force
includes just a single IP article (the Israel-U.S. FTA), and no U.S. FTA
in force fits into the “brief chapter” category.
The USMCA and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), both signed in 2018, are
prominent in the detailed-chapter category. With more than 25,000
words, the CPTPP IP chapter is the longest FTA IP chapter to date, far
exceeding TRIPS’s comparatively modest 12,500 words. The IP
chapter in the USMCA ranks second with over 22,500 words, which
dwarfs not only TRIPS, but also the USMCA predecessor, the NAFTA
IP chapter, which was less than half of the length of the USMCA IP
chapter.43
B. The Significance of FTA IP Provisions
It might not initially be apparent why FTA IP provisions should be
of any significant concern—or at least why they should be of concern
outside the countries that have signed any particular FTA. It is true that
some FTAs have been concluded by countries that are major economic
players or by multiple countries, such as the CPTPP, USMCA, and the
EU treaties,44 and the effects of these FTAs may therefore extend far
beyond the borders of the particular FTA signatory countries. But
many other FTAs involve only two or three countries that have smaller
economies, and these FTAs do not seem to merit interest outside of
the two or three signatory countries.
Skeptics might also doubt that FTAs could have any particular
significance for IP law, which has enjoyed an impressive history of
harmonization at the international level, with the oldest international
IP treaties dating back to the 1880s.45 Many aspects of IP law have been
internationally harmonized to some degree, and it would seem that little
43. The NAFTA IP Chapter’s word count was slightly less than 10,000 words. See
North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 17, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
44. The term “FTAs,” as it is used in this Article, includes economic integration
agreements. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
45. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; The Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1896, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9927 (1986) (as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979) [hereinafter
Berne Convention].

1462

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1449

has been left to treaty-making outside of existing international IP treaties.
Additionally, international IP law benefits from a wide acceptance of
international IP treaties; the three major IP treaties—the Paris
Convention, the Berne Convention, and the TRIPS Agreement—have
each been signed by more than 160 parties.46
Importantly, IP law treaties do not just set minimum standards for
IP protection; they also constrain what countries may do outside of the
treaties. Parties to the Paris Convention may enter into other
agreements only if the agreements do not contravene the provisions of
the Convention;47 similarly, parties to the Berne Convention may only
enter into agreements that do not contravene the Convention or
agreements that provide rights to authors that are more extensive than
the rights that the Convention grants.48 TRIPS allows countries to
adopt “more extensive protection than is required” by TRIPS, as long
as the more extensive protection does not contravene TRIPS.49
Notwithstanding the significant scope that international IP treaties
cover, the wide acceptance that they enjoy, and the constraints that
they place on subsequent bilateral and regional treaties, such as FTAs,
it would be a mistake to discount the importance of FTA IP provisions,
whether inside or outside the countries that signed the FTAs. As
suggested in the previous Section and illustrated in Part III, below,
many FTAs do not merely reiterate existing international obligations,
basic principles, and general statements on IP protection; they include
detailed IP provisions that are more than mere TRIPS embellishments.

46. As of April 10, 2022, the numbers of parties to the conventions were as follows:
Berne Convention 181 countries, see WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties:
Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/
ShowResults?search_what=C&treaty_id=15 (last visited Apr. 15, 2022); Paris
Convention 178 countries, see WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties: Paris
Convention, WORLD INTELL . PROP . ORG ., https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/
ShowResults?search_what=C&treaty_id=2 (last visited Apr. 15, 2022); and TRIPS Agreement
164 parties, see Members and Observers, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma.cc/TFM5-Z7KC].
47. Paris Convention, supra note 45, art. 19.
48. “The Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into
special agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors
more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain other
provisions not contrary to this Convention. The provisions of existing agreements
which satisfy these conditions shall remain applicable.” Berne Convention, supra note
45, art. 20.
49. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 1(1).
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As any international obligations do, the IP law-related commitments
in FTAs matter most if they are actually implemented and put into
effect by the parties to the FTAs.50 Skeptics might doubt the potential
for enforcement of the FTA IP provisions, but even if there are few
instances of actions by FTA parties formally enforcing the provisions,
countries can employ other trade-related pressures to force
compliance, and additional forces might be in place to compel
compliance. Some recent disputes brought under bilateral investment
treaties have shown that FTA IP provisions can be weaponized, even if
the particular disputes did not result in a finding against the countries
that were the alleged treaty violators.51
The most obvious reason for any country and for any stakeholder to
be interested, even in FTAs to which their own country is not a party,
is the extension of the effects that any FTA might have through the

50. In some cases, regional organizations might be parties to the treaties instead
of individual countries.
51. For examples of FTAs that expressly include IP rights in their definition of
“investment” see Agreement Between the EFTA States and Singapore, art. 37(b), June
26, 2002, https://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/free-trade-relations/
singapore/EFTA-Singapore%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8RM-NBJW]; Agreement for a New-Age Economic Partnership,
Japan-Sing., art. 72(a)(vi), Jan. 13, 2002, 2739 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Japan-Singapore
FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, Chile-S. Kor, art. 10.1, Feb. 15, 2003, https://investment
policy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2646/download
[https://perma.cc/UX8A-PVZU] [hereinafter Chile-Korea FTA]; Australia-Thailand
FTA, supra note 35, art. 901(f); Free Trade Agreement, China-Pak., art. 46(1)(d), Nov.
24, 2006, https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/China-Pakistan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4A9-BKE7]; ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39,
ch. 11, art. 2(c)(iii); India-Korea FTA, supra note 36, art. 10.1; Free Trade Agreement
Between the EFTA States and Ukraine, art. 4.2(c), June 24, 2010,
https://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/documents/legal-texts/free-traderelations/ukraine/EFTA-Ukraine%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZS56-VVKK]; Agreement for a Closer Economic Partnership,
Malay.-Pak., art. 88(1)(d)(iv), Nov. 8, 2007, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2543/download [https://
perma.cc/6K9P-QEEQ] [hereinafter Malaysia-Pakistan FTA]; Free Trade Agreement,
China-Peru, art. 126(d), Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/PER_CHN/
PER_CHN_e/FullText_20090422_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ4H-GYJ3] [hereinafter
China-Peru FTA]; Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, N.Z.-Thai., art. 92(a)(iv),
Apr. 19, 2005, 2524 U.N.T.S. 279; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) Between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union and Its Member
States, of the Other Part, art. 8.1, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter EUCanada FTA].
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principle of most-favored-nation treatment.52 The most-favored-nation
treatment principle was introduced in international IP law at the
multilateral level by TRIPS Article 4, according to which a country that
grants “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” to nationals of
any other country with regard to IP must then accord the same
“advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” to nationals of all WTO
countries.53 Therefore, in IP law, WTO member countries must extend
their best treatment of foreign nationals—including treatment
stemming from an FTA commitment—to the nationals of all WTO
member countries, and persons and entities benefit from the FTA IP
provisions in the countries that are parties to an FTA even if their own
country has not acceded to the same provisions.54
52. Thomas Cottier & Marina Foltea, Global Governance in Intellectual Property
Protection: Does the Decision-Making Forum Matter?, 3 WIPO J. 139, 151–52 (2012) (noting
the difference in the effects of FTAs concluded before and after TRIPS); see also IsraelU.S. FTA, supra note 20, art. 14 (including a most-favored-nation principle provision
that pre-dates TRIPS).
53. There are four types of agreements that TRIPS exempts from the principle:
pre-TRIPS agreements, agreements on judicial assistance and law enforcement,
agreements on certain neighboring rights, and treatment under the Berne
Convention and the Rome Convention when “the treatment accorded [is to] be a
function not of national treatment but of the treatment accorded in another country.”
TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 4(b).
On the inclusion of the most-favored-nation treatment principle in the Israel-U.S. FTA
see supra note 20, art. 14.
For the uses of the most-favored-nation treatment principle in international
treaties in general see, for example, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., MOST-FAVOUREDNATION TREATMENT, at 9 fol., U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1, U.N. Sales No.
10.II.D.19 (2010), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeia20101_en.pdf.
54. See Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Dalindyebo Shabalala, Intellectual Property
Treaties and Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 41, 68 (Daniel
J. Gervais, 2d ed. 2014) (noting that because of the most-favored-nation principle,
FTAs “have the effect of multilateralizing bilateral obligations on IP”). Other treaties
may include anti-discrimination provisions that will have the same effect as the mostfavored-nation principle. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-92 & C-326/92, Collins v. Imtrat
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1993 E.C.R. I-5145, I-5180, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=ADC404CC8D9178F7E3E3695CDB9416C8?text=&docid=9846
2&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1053934
[https://perma.cc/7U6G-86UM]; Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual Property, Nationality,
and Non-Discrimination, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. [WIPO], INTELLECTUAL
PROP. AND HUMAN RIGHTS 175–99 (1999) (prepared for panel discussion on
intellectual property and human rights held in commemoration of fiftieth anniversary
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

2022]

UNJUSTLY VILIFIED TRIPS-PLUS?

1465

The most-favored-nation treatment principle affects not only rights
and interests inside a party to an FTA, but it may also affect rights and
interests outside the country. The scope of the effects of FTA
commitments coincides with the scope of the implementing national
law, and to the extent that the national law has any extraterritorial
effects, the FTA commitments implemented in the law do as well.55 The
national law and the FTA commitments that the law implements may
also have indirect extraterritorial effects; for example, a stronger IP
protection in a country–FTA party may improve an IP rights owner’s
market, negotiation, or litigation positions even outside the country.
In addition to creating effects for particular stakeholders, FTAs serve
other important functions. An FTA may be a useful source of
information about the countries that concluded the FTA; in IP law, an
FTA may indicate the countries’ interests and suggest their intentions
for future bilateral, regional, or multilateral negotiations. An FTA may
set a standard for future FTA negotiations and establish a template that
countries use in their future FTAs with other countries.56 In some cases,
On a proposal by Switzerland to introduce into TRIPS an exception to the
most-favored-nation principle see Thu-Lang Tran Wasescha, Negotiating for Switzerland,
in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY
ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 171 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015).
55. On the extraterritorial reach of IP laws see, for example, Timothy R. Holbrook,
Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119 (2008) (articulating an
approach that would require courts to explicitly consider foreign law in assessing
whether to enforce a patent extraterritorially); Marketa Trimble, The Extraterritorial
Enforcement of Patent Rights, in PATENT ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE 569 (Christopher
Heath ed., 3d ed. 2015) (discussing the means that patent owners employ to enforce
patent rights abroad).
56. See, for example, the similarities among U.S. FTAs following the United States’
FTA with Chile, and Korea’s FTAs following its FTA with the United States. Free Trade
Agreement, Chile-U.S., ch. 17, June 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/6JTE-NDXM] [hereinafter
Chile-U.S. FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., ch. 18, June 30, 2007,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text
[https://perma.cc/7RZD-WB58] [hereinafter Korea-U.S. FTA]. On the use of FTAs
as templates for future agreements see, for example, RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra
note 7, at 174; MATTHEW KENNEDY, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: APPLYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STANDARDS IN A TRADE LAW FRAMEWORK
98 (2016); Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-Regional
Agreement on Life Support), 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 106–07 (2017); see also
SANTA CRUZ S., supra note 8, at 10, who notes, about the pre-2007 EU FTA IP provisions,
that “[d]espite the differences in context, the complexity and sophistication of the
respective IP provisions in the various types of agreements do not vary substantially
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FTAs may reveal where countries are positioning themselves for
further negotiations with the same or other countries.57 Crucially, FTAs
provide an important framework for future negotiations because FTAs
limit or foreclose countries’ flexibilities in future negotiations. FTAs
can be difficult to renegotiate, and it may be undesirable to open them
for renegotiation; therefore, parties may be locked into the FTAs and
their FTA commitments for years to come.58
As the number of FTAs increase and bind more countries in a
complicated web of overlapping IP law-related obligations, the risk is
that the cumulation of FTAs becomes counterproductive. Regardless
of the particular content of FTA IP provisions, their inflation has
generated justified doubts about their utility and called attention to
the FTA landscape.59 It is important to be aware of negotiated and
concluded FTA IP provisions and to monitor the coherency of the FTA
web. If, as this Article suggests, FTAs can be useful tools for international
IP lawmaking, particularly when international treaty-making has
faltered, FTAs must serve a meaningful function.
II.

THE EXISTING CRITICISMS OF FTA IP PROVISIONS

FTA IP provisions have attracted a great deal of criticism, and this
Part summarizes the most important critical points raised by various
commentators.60 This Part does not list all critical points appearing in
the literature but focuses instead on structural criticisms of the role of
FTAs in IP law and policy. This Part does not cover the general

from one agreement to the other. Indeed, the [EU] IP chapters in the agreements are
quite homogeneous, with relatively few variations between them.”
57. For example, future positioning was the strategy taken by countries in the
CPTPP negotiations after the United States left the CPTPP negotiations. See Jeremy de
Beer, Intellectual Property Chapter of USMCA Proves Canada’s Pragmatism, CTR. FOR INT’L
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/
intellectual-property-chapter-usmca-proves-canadas-pragmatism
[https://perma.cc/WW7Z-5TU2].
58. See infra Section III.A (discussing reasons why renegotiation may be difficult or
undesirable).
59. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
60. For an overview of four TRIPS-plus “[r]eductionist [n]arratives” see Daniel J.
Gervais, IP Calibration, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 86, 90 (Daniel
J. Gervais, 2d ed. 2014). For FTA criticisms in documents by international
organizations see Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property: A Regulatory Constraint to Redress
Inequalities, in INTERNATIONAL POLICY RULES AND INEQUALITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 179, 180 (José Antonio Ocampo ed., 2019).
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criticism that concerns the inclusion of IP matters in trade
negotiations;61 this criticism applies to TRIPS and is not specific to
TRIPS-plus developments. This Part presents no reactions to the
criticisms that it reviews; reactions are reserved for a later presentation
of the positive features of FTAs in Part III.
The criticism that appears perhaps most frequently is that FTAs have
raised, and continue to raise, the standard of IP protection. The
standard is typically measured in relation to TRIPS, which provides a
benchmark for IP protection that most countries must implement
under international law.62 The standard increase often consists of some
limitation or a complete elimination of TRIPS flexibilities that TRIPS,
intentionally or accidentally, has reserved to member countries to
utilize when they calibrate their national IP laws to comport with their
national circumstances and goals. Whether by choice, ignorance, or
necessity, countries have not always availed themselves of the
flexibilities, at least not fully or efficiently.63 However, the flexibilities
remain an important element of TRIPS; flexibilities in international

61. See, e.g., MPI PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 1.
62. Kamperman Sanders & Shabalala, supra note 54, at 65 (“The significant shift
in the framing of IP in international IP-related fora should not blind us to the fact that
TRIPS standards have become the floor for international IP protection.”); GRAEME B.
DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE
RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 148 (2012) (“FTAs
deal with matters that are already covered in TRIPS: in these cases, they either reiterate
TRIPS norms or raise the standards of protection above that level.”); id. at 144 (“But
many economists and traders . . . prefer to see TRIPS as a code; as setting . . . a globally
harmonized level of intellectual property protection, one that imposes a globally
optimal incentive to produce knowledge-intensive goods.”); see also Antony Taubman,
Thematic Review: Negotiating “Trade-Related Aspects” of Intellectual Property Rights, in THE
MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS 15, 49 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) (“The TRIPS
Agreement . . . has been used as a basis for further multilateral and bilateral
negotiations on IP in other spheres.”); cf. Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH.
J. 125, 130 (2004) (noting that “the TRIPS Agreement should never have been
understood as a crowning point of international intellectual property regulation”);
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 121 (2003) (“The TRIPS agreement is hardly the end of the story. In
many ways, it is just the beginning.”).
63. On some of the possible reasons that countries do not utilize flexibilities see,
for example, Duncan Matthews, TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Medicines in Developing
Countries: The Problem with Technical Assistance and Free Trade Agreements, 27 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 420 (2005).
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treaties often reflect negotiators’ acknowledgment and acceptance of
existing or potential national differences in law and policy choices.
Cottier and Foltea have pointed out that “[t]he analysis of TRIPS-plus
IP provisions suggests that certain obligations directly undermine these
flexibilities,”64 and there are indeed many examples of FTAs narrowing
the TRIPS flexibilities.65 The examples include a mandatory expansion
of patentable subject matter under patent law to protect plants,66 an
expansion of protectable subject matter under trademark law to
protect sounds,67 an extension of the grace period for patents to twelve

64. Cottier & Foltea, supra note 52, at 152.
65. For some other examples see DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 62, at 148;
SAM F. HALABI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:
OLIGOPOLY, REGULATION, AND WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 57–58 (2018).
66. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, Morocco-U.S., art. 15.9(2), June 15, 2004,
Hein’s No. KAV 7206 [hereinafter Morocco-U.S. FTA]; Agreement on the
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Bahr.-U.S., art. 14.8(2), Sept. 14, 2004, Hein’s No.
KAV 6866 [hereinafter Bahrain-U.S. FTA]. Under TRIPS, countries need not protect
plant varieties by patents; a sui generis form of protection is acceptable and indeed
preferred in many countries. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 27(3)(b); see also Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 18.37(4), Mar. 8, 2018,
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/tpp-11-treaty-text.pdf
[hereinafter
CPTPP]; Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada, art. 20.36(3), Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canadaagreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USMCA] (allowing countries to exclude
from patentability “plants other than microorganisms”).
67. See, e.g., Chile-U.S. FTA, supra note 56, art. 17.2(1); Free Trade Agreement,
Austl.-U.S., art. 17.2(2), May 18, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 6422 [hereinafter Australia-U.S.
FTA]; Morocco-U.S. FTA, supra note 66, art. 15.2(1); Trade Promotion Agreement,
Colom.-U.S., art. 16.2(1), Nov. 22, 2006, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/colombia-tpa/final-text
[https://perma.cc/Z56S-3DZJ]
[hereinafter Colombia-U.S. FTA]; Trade Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., art.
16.2(1), Apr. 12, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 8674 [hereinafter Peru-U.S. FTA]; Free Trade
Agreement, Oman-U.S., art. 15.2(1), Jan. 19, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 8673 [hereinafter
Oman-U.S. FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, Nicar.-Taiwan, art. 17.07(1), June 16, 2006,
https://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=677
[hereinafter
Nicaragua-Taiwan FTA]; Korea-U.S. FTA, supra note 56, art. 18.2(1); Trade Promotion
Agreement, Pan.-U.S., art. 15.2(1), June 28, 2007, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text [https://perma.cc/C5YNEWY6] [hereinafter Panama-U.S. FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, Colom.-S. Kor., art.
15.6(1), Feb. 21, 2013, http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/col_kor/
draft_text_06.2012_e/june_2012_index_pdf_e.asp [https://perma.cc/DVP3-GN37];
Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-S. Kor., art. 13.2(1), Apr. 8, 2014,
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https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/officialdocuments/Pages/full-text-of-kafta [hereinafter Australia-Korea FTA]; Free Trade
Agreement,
N.Z.-S.
Kor.,
art.
11.4(1),
Mar.
23,
2015,
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/korea-australia-free-trade-agreement.pdf
[hereinafter Korea-New Zealand FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, China-Geor., art.
11.11, May 13, 2017, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/georgia/annex/xdzw_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G58T-NJRN] [hereinafter China-Georgia FTA]; Free Trade
Agreement, Geor.-H.K., ch. 11, art. 11, June 28, 2018, https://www.tid
.gov.hk/english/ita/fta/hkgefta/text_agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/5E8QR8FV] [hereinafter Georgia-Hong Kong FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-H.K., art.
14.10(1), Mar. 26, 2019, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/ahkfta/a-hkfta-text/Pages/default [hereinafter Australia-Hong Kong FTA]; The
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art.
15.2(1),
Aug.
5,
2004,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text
[https://perma.cc/8VY5-4TPL] [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]; Free Trade Agreement,
Can.-S. Kor., art. 16.9(1), Sept. 22, 2014, https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/assets/pdfs/agreements-accords/korea-coree/16_CKFTA_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WQQ-GE3S] [hereinafter Canada-Korea FTA]; Free Trade
Agreement,
China-S.
Kor.,
art.
15.11(2),
June
1,
2015,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/3461/download [https://perma.cc/C6BY-PQNS] [hereinafter China-Korea
FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Colombia and the EFTA States,
art. 6.6.(1), Nov. 25, 2008, https://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/freetrade-relations/colombia/EFTAColombia%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement%20EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WU5H23C] [hereinafter EFTA-Colombia FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the
Republic of Peru and the EFTA States, art. 6.6(1), June 24-July 14, 2010,
https://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/documents/legal-texts/free-traderelations/peru/EFTA-Peru%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement%20EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TEJ9-DXXX] [hereinafter EFTA-Peru FTA]; Trade Agreement
Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and Colombia
and Peru, of the Other Part, art. 203, June 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 354) 3 [hereinafter
EU-Colombia and Peru FTA]; Free Trade Agreement , China-Switz., art. 11.7(1), July
6,
2013,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/2751/download
[https://perma.cc/DUK3-353R]
[hereinafter China-Switzerland FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Peru, art. 17.19,
Feb. 12, 2018, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/pafta/fulltext/Pages/fta-text-and-associated-documents [hereinafter Australia-Peru FTA];
CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.18; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.17. TRIPS does not
mandate that countries make trademark protection available for sounds. TRIPS, supra
note 4, art. 15(1).
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months,68 an elimination of the principle of international exhaustion
(by mandating the principle of national or regional exhaustion),69 and
a requirement of border measures for patents and for both
importation and exportation.70 Frankel has observed that even when

68. See, e.g., Morocco-U.S. FTA, supra note 66, art. 15.9(8); Bahrain-U.S. FTA, supra
note 66, art. 14.8(8); Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Malay., art. 13.11(2), May 22, 2012,
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/Malaysia-Australia-Free-TradeAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Australia-Malaysia FTA]; Australia-Korea FTA, supra note
67, art. 13.8(5); CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.38; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.37.
TRIPS does not address the grace period. In first-to-file patent systems, the grace
period tends to be shorter than twelve months. See, e.g., European Patent Convention,
art. 55, Oct. 5, 1973 (as revised in 1991 and 2000).
69. E.g., Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community and Their Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia,
of the Other Part, art. 152, June 27, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 261) 4 [hereinafter EU-Georgia
FTA]; Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic
Energy Community and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of
Moldova, of the Other Part, art. 279, June 27, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 260) 4 [hereinafter
EU-Moldova FTA]. TRIPS does not mandate a particular type of exhaustion principle.
TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 6; see also Association Agreement Between the European
Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part, art.
160, June 27, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 161) 1 [hereinafter EU-Ukraine FTA] (confirming
that countries are free to select the principle of exhaustion); Strategic Partnership and
Cooperation
Agreement
,
Geor.-U.K.,
art.
144,
Oct.
21,
2019,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/844167/CS_Georgia_1.2019_UK_Georgia_Strategic_Partnership_a
nd_Cooperation_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/D29F-MXZU] [hereinafter
Georgia-U.K. FTA] (confirming the same).
70. See, e.g., Agreement for a Strategic Economic Partnership, Chile-Japan, art.
161(1), Mar. 27, 2007, 2751 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter Chile-Japan FTA] (requiring
border measures for both importation and exportation and for goods infringing
patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, and copyrights and related
rights); Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Ukr., art. 11.8, July 11, 2016,
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAN_UKR/EiF/CUFTA_EiF_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NPP8-NXY3] [hereinafter Canada-Ukraine FTA] (requiring
border measures for both importation and exportation); Australia-Hong Kong FTA,
supra note 67, arts. 14.16(3)–(4) (requiring border measures for both importation and
exportation); China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.26(1) (requiring border
measures for “the importation, exportation, transshipment, placement under a free
zone and placement under a bonded warehouse”); EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra
note 67, art. 249 (requiring border measures for “import, export, or transit of goods”);
Economic Partnership Agreement Between the CARIFORUM States, of the One Part,
and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part, art. 163(1),
Oct. 15, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289) 3 [hereinafter EU-CARIFORUM FTA] (requiring
border measures for “importation, exportation, re-exportation, entry or exit of the
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some FTA provisions have been “framed as minimum standards, [they]
are more prescriptive and allow for less flexibility in implementation
than the minimum standards required under TRIPS.”71
customs territory, placement under a suspensive procedure or placement under a
customs free zone or a customs free warehouse”); Agreement Between the European
Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, art. 14.51 (1), July 17, 2018, 2018 O.J.
(L 330) 3 [hereinafter EU-Japan FTA] (requiring border measures for both
importation and exportation); EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 250 (requiring
border measures for “importation, exportation, re-exportation, entry into or exit from
the customs territory,” including for goods infringing a patent, a supplementary
protection certificate, a plant variety right, a design, or a geographical indication).
TRIPS does not require countries to introduce customs measures for exportation or
for goods other than goods bearing counterfeit trademarks and pirated copyrighted
goods. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 51.
Additional examples of raised standards are in the following FTAs: Agreement
for an Economic Partnership, Indon.-Japan, art. 121, Aug. 20, 2007, 2780 U.N.T.S. 133
[hereinafter Indonesia-Japan FTA] (requiring criminal penalties in cases of
infringement of patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, or layout
designs, copyrights or related rights, or plant breeder’s rights if committed willfully
and on a commercial scale); ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13
(expanding criminal procedures and penalties beyond the cases for which they are
mandated under TRIPS); Australia-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 13.9(27) (requiring
criminal procedures and penalties for bootlegging); EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69,
arts. 165–66 (requiring that the countries provide a 25-year term of protection for
previously unpublished works that are published after the expiry of copyright
protection, and permitting the countries to protect “critical and scientific publications
of works which have come into the public domain” for 30 years from their
publication); Canada-Ukraine FTA, supra, arts. 11.6–11.7 (requiring imprisonment
and monetary fines as penalties for bootlegging, and requiring criminal enforcement
for infringements of copyright and related rights on the internet); CPTPP, supra note
66, art. 18.76(9) & n.125 (requiring that countries apply border measures to more
than small quantities of “goods of a commercial nature sent in small consignments”);
CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.77(4); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.84(4) (requiring
criminal procedures and penalties for bootlegging); Agreement for a Comprehensive
Economic
Partnership,
Japan-U.K.,
art.
14.58(4),
Oct.
23,
2020,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/929181/CS_Japan_1.2020_UK_Japa
n_Agreement_Comprehensive_Economic_Partnership__v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4DX-7VCF] [hereinafter Japan-U.K. FTA] (requiring criminal
procedures and penalties for bootlegging). For the rights in the EU-Ukraine FTA see
also Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, Arts.
4–5, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12.
71. Susy Frankel, The Fusion of Intellectual Property and Trade, in FRAMING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INTEGRATING INCENTIVES, TRADE,
DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 103 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss &
Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng eds., 2018).
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FTAs do not raise IP protection standards only by limiting or
eliminating TRIPS flexibilities; some FTAs introduce forms of IP or IP-like
protection that strengthen the position of IP rights owners, even when
TRIPS does not cover such forms of protection at all—or does not cover
them expressly.72 Provisions on data exclusivity and supplementary
protection certificates have been among the most criticized of these
TRIPS-plus provisions.73 FTAs have also raised standards by mandating
that countries relinquish transitional periods that were created for
their benefit; for instance, Nicaragua agreed to implement TRIPS

72. Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss refer to these new forms of protection as “instruments
that are not incorporated into TRIPS and which impose obligations not otherwise
required by the WTO.” DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 62, at 148.
73. HALABI, supra note 65, at 57 (“The costliest TRIPS-plus terms are those that
impose ‘data exclusivity’ separate from patent protection.”); Bryan Mercurio, TRIPSPlus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO
LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 226–29 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); see, e.g.,
Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Jordan-U.S., art. 4.22, Oct. 24,
2000, Hein’s No. KAV 5970; Chile-U.S. FTA, supra note 56, art. 17.10; Free Trade
Agreement, Sing.-U.S., art. 16.8, May 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text [hereinafter SingaporeU.S. FTA]; Australia-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.10; Morocco-U.S. FTA, supra note
68, art. 15.10; CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.10; Bahrain-U.S. FTA, supra note 66,
art. 14.8(8); Peru-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.10; Colombia-U.S. FTA, supra note
67, art. 16.10; Oman-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.9; EFTA-Colombia FTA, supra
note 67, art. 6.11; EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.11; Agreement on Free Trade
and Economic Partnership, Japan-Switz., art. 121, Feb. 19, 2009, 2642 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Japan-Switzerland FTA]; EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, arts. 220, 222;
EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, arts. 186–87; EU-Moldova FTA, supra note 69, arts.
314, 315; EU-Canada FTA, supra note 51, art. 20.27; Free Trade Agreement, Sing.Turk.,
art.
15.21,
Nov.
14,
2015,
https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg//media/esg/files/non-financial-assistance/for-companies/free-tradeagreements/trsfta/turkey-legal-text-trsfta.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/52L8-ZXT5]
[hereinafter Singapore-Turkey FTA]; CPTPP, supra note 66, arts. 18.50–18.51;
USMCA, supra note 66, arts. 20.48, 20.50; EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.37; Free
Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, art.
10.33, Oct. 19, 2018, 2019 O.J. (L 294) 3 [hereinafter EU-Singapore FTA]; GeorgiaU.K. FTA, supra note 69, arts. 178–179; Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership
Agreement,
Ukr.-U.K.,
arts.
210,
212,
Oct.
8,
2020,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/934935/CS_Ukraine_1.2020_UK_Ukraine_Political_Free_Tra
de_Strat_Partner_Agreement.pdf [hereinafter Ukraine-U.K. FTA].
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before the expiration of the transitional period so that it could benefit
from a trade arrangement with the United States.74
Commentators do not spare strong words to describe FTA increases
in IP protection; Drahos labels them the “global IP ratchet,”75 and Kur
describes “the incessant demands for increased [IP] protection” that
FTAs reflect.76 Musungu and Dutfiled have indicated their judgment
of FTAs in their definition of TRIPs-plus as “rules and practices which
have the effect of reducing the ability of developing countries to
protect the public interest.”77
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss explain that the context of trade
negotiations is particularly suitable to manipulating weaker countries
into agreeing to stronger IP protection because trade negotiations
“involve so many economic sectors that countries with capacity and
leverage deficits will have difficulty evaluating the instrument or
adequately protecting their intellectual property interests.”78
Reichman states that trade negotiations and FTAs can therefore serve
“a maximalist agenda that has been rejected in multilateral
negotiations since the 1990s”;79 “capital exporters” may achieve what
Anderson and Razavi describe as “a net ratcheting-up of IPR
standards.”80

74. Alan M. Anderson & Bobak Razavi, The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights:
TRIPS, BITS, and the Search for Uniform Protection, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 265, 272
(2010). For an example of a confirmation of TRIPS transitional periods in an FTA see
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13, art. 11.
75. Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791, 798 (2001).
76. Annette Kur, From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules, in TRIPS PLUS 20:
FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 133, 133 (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 2016).
77. SISULE F. MUSUNGU & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A
TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION (WIPO) 1, 3
(Quaker United Nations Office ed., 2003), https://quno.org/sites/default/
files/resources/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4XM-NCMS].
78. DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 62, at 148. On the criticism of the lack of
transparency in FTA negotiations see Susy Frankel, Trade-Offs and Transparency, 44
INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 913, 917–18 (2013); Moerland, supra note
7, at 766–67.
79. Jerome H. Reichman, Reframing Intellectual Property Rights with Fewer Distortions
of the Trade Paradigm, in FRAMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
INTEGRATING INCENTIVES, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 62, 83
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng eds., 2018).
80. Anderson & Razavi, supra note 74, at 274.
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Critics have presented developing countries in particular as victims
of the “maximalist agenda.”81 Kur, Okediji, Yu, and others criticize
FTAs for ignoring or not sufficiently respecting the problems that
developing countries have faced, and charge that developed countries
have used FTAs to induce or even force developing countries to forego
flexibilities in exchange for the possibility of entering into FTAs.82 In
Kur’s words, “the industrialized part of the world employed [the
promise of improved trade conditions] as a lever to impose enhanced
protection standards on threshold and developing countries.”83 Yu
warns that, in the process, the developing countries had little or no
opportunity to reflect on or advocate for their interests, and the
resulting higher IP protection standard can often completely ignore
the countries’ needs.84
Critics have also pointed out that the prominent role that the United
States has held in trade negotiations enables it to influence the design
of FTAs to revise the national IP laws of other countries to conform to
the U.S. standard current at the time the FTAs were negotiated.85 Even
81. Cf. Ng-Loy Wee Loon, The Story of Singapore’s Intellectual Property Journey: 1965–
2013, 5 WIPO J. 127, 134 (2013) (noting that in the case of the U.S.-Singapore FTA,
“Singapore was hardly a ‘victim’” because “the higher level of IP protection under the
US-Singapore FTA appears to be within the Government’s agenda”).
82. Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations:
Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 232 (2014)
(“[B]ilateral trade and investment agreements were offered to developing countries
in exchange for agreements to forego flexibilities or implement TRIPS-plus
standards.”).
83. Kur, supra note 76, at 136.
84. Yu, supra note 56, at 113.
85. See, e.g., RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 173 (discussing the significant
effects that the Australia-U.S. FTA had on Australian copyright law and noting that
while Australian implementing legislation “ran to nearly 100 pages,” “[n]o
corresponding change to US domestic laws occurred”); Straus, supra note 5, at 207
(discussing how Australia’s FTA with the United States resulted in Australia de facto
adopting the examination guidelines of the USPTO); Anupam Chander, Exporting
DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 205, 205–217 (2006) (discussing the
exportation through FTAs of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anticircumvention provisions). Cf. Morin et al., supra note 8, at 99 (showing empirically
that “socialisation,” underpinned by various factors other than FTAs, might have a
substantial effect on a developing country’s adoption of “US-style IP rules”); see also
Miranda Forsyth, The Need for a Pluralist Approach to the Link Between Intellectual Property
and Development: A Pacific Island Case Study, 8 WIPO J. 123, 125 (2016) (mentioning that
FTA “pressure alone does not explain the success of the expansion of intellectual
property laws, policies and implementation programmes throughout the developing
world”).
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worse, after countries subscribe to the increased U.S. level of
protection of IP rights, those countries might begin promoting the
same level of protection in their own FTAs with other countries. Yu has
detected this “disturbing” phenomenon when “South Korea injected
the terms of its free trade agreement with the United States into the
[Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade agreement]
negotiations, despite the fact that the United States [was] not even a
party to those negotiations.”86 The imposition of U.S. standards on
other countries appears even more disturbing in light of the serious
ongoing debates in the United States about whether some aspects of
existing U.S. IP law truly serve innovation, creativity, and other IP
policy goals.87
Even assuming that some single country’s law could provide the ideal
IP regime in that particular country, it does not follow that
transplanting that law to another country would be the best choice for
the other country. Without sufficient consideration of its own
circumstances, a country that blindly implements a legal transplant
may disadvantage itself, and a lack of truly negotiated rules may defeat
any chance for the provisions in an FTA to become a useful experiment
in international IP law.88 Additionally, locking national law provisions
through the medium of FTAs may inhibit countries’ ability to adjust
their laws to the latest developments, and to future developments.
Correa has warned that the resulting inflexibility in national regulation
may “contribute to an increase in inequality both between and within
countries” and “have adverse economic and social effects.”89
FTAs have been criticized not only for amplifying the influence of
developed countries on developing countries, but also for reflecting
pressures from lobbies favoring stronger IP protection. These
pressures are not present only in developing countries; developed
countries, including the United States, also experience these
pressures.90 Echoing the democratic deficit concerns that are present
in other contexts, Reichman and Kaminski have been critical of the
86. Yu, supra note 56, at 107.
87. See, e.g., the ongoing debates on the patent protection for computerimplemented inventions and the potential revision of section 512 of the U.S. Copyright
Act.
88. Yu, supra note 56, at 113–14.
89. Correa, supra note 60, at 179.
90. Kaminski has reported on the “institutional capture of USTR” by special
interests. Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 978 (2014).
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executive branches for hijacking FTA negotiations to accomplish their
own domestic IP law objectives that the executives were unable to
implement in their own countries through the legislative process.91
According to Reichman, “these negotiators try to reconfigure
unfavorable domestic laws or precedents into more pliable
international standards; codify favorable domestic judicial
interpretations as international rules; and omit aspects of existing
domestic laws that balance intellectual property protection against
other values.”92
Commentators have criticized FTA negotiations as depriving
developing countries of the benefit of collective bargaining—the
opportunity to exert their “collective weight,” which helps promote
their interests in international negotiations. As Adrian Otten, the
former WTO Secretary of the Uruguay Round TRIPS Negotiation
Group, has described in his recollection of the TRIPS negotiations, the
possibility of benefitting from its “collective weight” was what attracted
developing countries to the TRIPS negotiations.93 He has suggested
that bilateral and regional FTA negotiations do not offer the possibility
(that was available in the TRIPS negotiations) to “exploit the
differences between the major demandeurs,” and therefore, bilateral
and regional negotiations are unlikely to “yield as much flexibility” as
multilateral negotiations do and are not going to provide “the same
degree of legitimacy.”94 Similarly, Cottier and Foltea have argued that
“multilateral fora would be more appropriate to secure the flexibilities
and policy space provided in the agreements drawn up
multilaterally.”95

91. See Susan K. Sell, The Dynamics of International IP Policymaking, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 73, 81–82 (Daniel J. Gervais, 2d ed. 2014); see also infra note 121
and accompanying text.
92. Reichman, supra note 79, at 84; see also Okediji, supra note 82, at 199
(commenting on “the resilience of local interest, sometimes working in concert with
transnational actors, in identifying those domestic considerations that could
successfully blunt the toughest edges of multilateral IP obligations”).
93. Adrian Otten, The TRIPS Negotiations: An Overview, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 55, 75
(Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015); see also Chidi Oguamanam, IP in
Global Governance: A Venture in Critical Reflection, 2 WIPO J. 196, 201 (2011) (referring
to the United States’ “‘divide-and-conquer’ politics” in FTA negotiations).
94. Otten, supra note 93, at 75.
95. Cottier & Foltea, supra note 52, at 153.
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Vigorous FTA activity has produced an intricate web of overlapping
obligations that have fragmented international IP law. Hilty calls it an
“alarming movement” that countries continue to enter into “a
dramatically increasing number of bilateral or regional free-trade
agreements covering a range of topics of varying degrees of interest for
the countries involved.”96 Consequently, countries may willingly or
inadvertently enter into various FTAs that subject them to mutually
conflicting obligations,97 and El Said and Ruse-Khan warn about the
negative effects on global trade of the “fragmentation of policy
making”98 and “the uncoordinated expansion of TRIPS-plus rules.”99
Recent disputes have shown that investment treaties (or investment
chapters of FTAs) and associated dispute resolution processes may be
used to weaponize FTAs, including FTA IP provisions100—a prospect
that has frightened the commentators who have been critical of a lack
of sufficient IP expertise in trade negotiations and perceive an even
greater lack of IP expertise in investment law and the associated
dispute resolution processes. Frankel, Ho, Yu, and others have been
96. Reto M. Hilty, Ways Out of the Trap of Article 1(1) TRIPS, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM
TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 185, 191 (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 2016).
97. Tim Engelhardt, Geographical Indications under Recent EU Trade Agreements, 46
INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 781, 817 (2015) (“Considering that Canada
will commit to protect numerous EU GIs, including some that may currently be used
by US producers, Canada may end up with conflicting obligations towards the USA
under the NAFTA regime on the one hand and the EU under CETA on the other.”).
For an example of one means to address an FTA overlap see CPTPP, supra note
66, Annex 18-F (Annex to Section J) (providing an alternative to the obligation to
implement the CPTPP section on the liability of internet service providers by allowing
countries to implement, in the alternative, the corresponding article of the U.S.-Chile
FTA).
98. Mohammed El Said, The Compatibility of Modern Intellectual Property Protection
Norms with Islamic Principles: Lessons from History, 4 WIPO J. 121, 128 (2012).
99. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, IP and Trade in Post-TRIPS Environment, in TRIPS
PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 163, 164 (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds.,
2018). For general information about FTAs see Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The
Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS 1, 2–3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1995) (referring to the
“spaghetti-bowl proliferation of preferential trade arrangements [that] clutter[] up
trade”); MPI PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 2 (commenting on the “ero[sion of] the policy
space inherent in the TRIPS Agreement”).
100. See generally Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Challenging Compliance with
International Intellectual Property Norms in Investor–State Dispute Settlement, 19 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 241 (2016); Peter K. Yu, Crossfertilizing ISDS with TRIPS, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L. J.
321 (2017); Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, Reconceptualizing ISDS: When Is IP an
Investment and How Much Can States Regulate It?, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 377 (2018).
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alarmed by the potential impact of investment treaty dispute resolution
processes on international and national IP laws;101 Ho predicts that
“investment claims may create havoc concerning TRIPS flexibilities.”102
Some commentators have not stopped at criticizing FTA
developments and have called for remedial measures to be taken to
halt or mitigate increases in IP protection in FTAs. Maskus and
Reichman have proposed a moratorium on TRIPS-plus FTA IP
provisions;103 the moratorium would help stabilize international IP law
and perhaps facilitate the adoption of a new international treaty that
would consolidate international IP law.104 In fact, Reichman has
suggested that such a moratorium might be beneficial for countries’
domestic IP lawmaking as well; he has argued that the “secret
intellectual property negotiations” of FTAs not only “generat[e]
mistrust of the international trade system built around the WTO” but
also unnecessarily “prematurely freeze domestic laws.”105 In 2004, in
support of a proposal for the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) development agenda that was submitted by Argentina and
Brazil, representatives of non-governmental organizations, academics,
scientists, and others signed the Geneva Declaration on the Future of
the World Intellectual Property Organization, which called on WIPO
to impose “a moratorium on new treaties and harmonization of
standards that expand and strengthen monopolies and further restrict
access to knowledge.”106

101. Yu, supra note 100, at 321–41; Pusceddu, supra note 8, at 1069.
102. Cynthia M. Ho, A Collision Course Between TRIPS Flexibilities and Investor-State
Proceedings, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 397 (2016).
103. K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 36 (Keith E.
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); see also Reichman, supra note 79, at 88.
104. Ruse-Khan has noted that when “[c]omparing this post-TRIPS [fragmented]
environment with pre-TRIPS era in the 1970-1980s . . . interesting parallels emerge . . .
[W]ith these multilateral standards increasingly superseded by unilateral, bilateral and
regional expansions of IP protection beyond TRIPS, a situation similar to the preTRIPS era emerges.” Ruse-Khan, supra note 99, at 171.
105. Reichman, supra note 79, at 88. The secrecy in international IP negotiations
has been a point of intense criticism since the negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement.
106. Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization, OPEN
SOC’Y FOUND., https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/32d73d81-1463498b-9b75-cfddc6126db3/wipo_declaration_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/98KX-3DPD].
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As an alternative to a complete halt in FTA negotiations, Frankel has
proposed formulating and implementing guiding principles for FTA
negotiations so that negotiations “might less-destructively progress.”107
Similarly, Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss have suggested that “organizations
with expertise in areas touching on intellectual property can help
states with weak capacity to fully utilize the flexibilities found in TRIPS,
to analyze proposed bilaterals, and to withstand unilateral pressure.”108
Some commentators have posited that increases in IP protection
could be stopped if international IP law set upper limits on IP
protection; Dreyfuss and Kur have advocated for setting “substantive
maxima,”109 possibly in “ceiling treaties” that would set mandatory IP
rules with ceilings on IP protection.110 Ruse-Khan has agreed with the
need to introduce such “ceilings” as “an additional element of the
international IP system”111 but has also argued that some “ceiling
provisions” are already included in various TRIPS provisions—they
need only to be properly interpreted as such.112 Another measure that
commentators have proposed to mitigate increases in IP protection is
the inclusion in FTAs of rights that would establish meaningful
counterweights to the rights of IP rights owners; in this context, user
rights have been mentioned as a possible candidate.113
III. POSITIVE FEATURES OF FTA IP PROVISIONS
Existing criticisms of FTA IP provisions leave doubts as to whether
there is any redeeming value whatsoever in FTA IP content. The
criticisms have been more than adequately set forth by others, which
leaves to this Article the analysis of the “bright side”; it focuses on
features of the provisions that can be perceived as positive features of

107. Frankel, supra note 71, at 108.
108. DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 62, at 147.
109. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21, 27 (2004).
110. Kur, supra note 76, at 146. On “substantive maxima” see generally Annette Kur,
International Norm-Making in the Field of Intellectual Property: A Shift Towards Maximum
Rules?, 1 WIPO J. 27 (2009).
111. Ruse-Khan, supra note 99, at 181.
112. Id. at 170 (“Article 41:1, as well as several other specific provisions in the
enforcement part of TRIPS and especially its section on border measures, can be
understood as binding maximum standards or ceilings which constrain the ability of
WTO members to introduce TRIPS-plus IP enforcement rules.”).
113. DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 62, at 199; Dreyfuss, supra note 109, at 22.
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TRIPS-plus developments.114 Before Section B presents and analyzes
particular FTA features, Section A acknowledges the complexity of
defining what “positive” means in the context of FTAs.
A.

Defining the “Positives” of Existing IP Provisions in FTAs

Identifying the features in FTAs, or in any other agreements, that
are objectively, unequivocally, and universally positive is difficult.115
Countries pursue their own goals in FTA negotiations, and their
expectations of and perspectives on what constitute positive outcomes
will vary widely. Nor does an entire country have a single perception
because different stakeholders—government actors, political actors,
private actors—have different stakes in negotiations and different
views of outcomes. Impressions may also evolve as the effects of an FTA
emerge.116
Defining what “positive” means is also difficult because no single IP
law is ideal for all countries and at all times. Opinions on IP policies
differ and evolve, and even in countries with highly developed IP laws,
such as the United States, experts and stakeholders disagree on many
significant questions in IP law.117 At the international level, assessment
of IP law is even more complicated because each country’s IP law is
embedded in its national legal system, where the law must be calibrated
to reflect socio-economic and other factors while operating effectively
and in harmony with other elements of the legal system.118 An illconsidered introduction of a legal transplant can destabilize a legal

114. This Article does not adopt Carlos Correa’s taxonomy that distinguishes
“TRIPS-minimum,” “TRIPS-plus,” “TRIPS-extra,” “TRIPS ceilings,” and “TRIPSminus.” See Correa, supra note 60, at 181–82.
115. On the nuances of international negotiations and the resulting outcomes see
Taubman, supra note 62, at 22 (referring to TRIPS negotiations).
116. Taubman, supra note 62, at 42 (commenting on TRIPS negotiations that “it is
misleading to assume that the negotiations were essentially between North and South
[because of] the diversity of interests and shifting alliances that cut across the full
economic and political spectrum of negotiators”); see also John Gero, Why We Managed
to Succeed in TRIPS, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM
THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 95, 97, 98 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman
eds., 2015).
117. For example, the patentability of computer-implemented inventions and the
transformative character of use in the fair use doctrine.
118. On the topic of IP law calibration with the rest of a national legal system see,
e.g., Marketa Trimble, Patent Working Requirements: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 483 (2016).
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system and defeat the effectiveness of both the transplanted law and
the other elements in the system.
Value judgments about FTAs vary by industry and stakeholder; for
instance, the pharmaceutical industry, the motion picture industry,
and the luxury brand industry might not agree on specific provisions
in a particular FTA, regardless of the country from which their
members originate.119 Though some FTA IP provisions might be
positive to a particular industry in all countries, other provisions might
favor only industry players in one or some FTA countries.
National executive branches, which are in charge of FTA
negotiations, might have an even more nuanced view of pluses in FTA
negotiations. No negotiator wants to lose in a negotiation; all want to
please their constituents and emerge victorious from international
negotiations. But internally, the interests are more complicated. For
some negotiators, the primary goal of FTA negotiations—of some or
all of them—is to negotiate FTA IP provisions that follow their own
national law; success might be measured by how minimal the changes
to their national law must be when their country implements the
negotiated provisions.120
There are many reasons to seek FTA IP provisions that are identical
or extremely similar to the national law of the negotiators’ country.
Negotiators have a self-serving interest to avoid amendments to their
national law necessitated by an FTA if the task of implementation will
devolve to them or their national agency. Apart from a concern about
increased workload, negotiators may be concerned that any reopening
of national laws to the legislative process could cause the introduction
of additional, undesirable non-FTA-related amendments. Negotiators
may seek to cement existing national law by replicating the provisions
of national law into an FTA, making the national law provisions
unchangeable or much more difficult to change.121 And negotiators

119. See Susy Frankel, The Continuing Excesses of Trade Agreements and the Object and
Purpose of International Intellectual Property, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 523, 526 (2019) (observing, in the evaluation of FTA IP provision effects, that “the
effects of too much protection are not just a ‘developed’ versus ‘developing’ matter,
but the restrictions that excessive rights place on development also negatively impact
industries in developed countries”).
120. See SANTA CRUZ S., supra note 8, at 32 (advising “countries engaging in
negotiations with the EU” to “consider putting on the table provisions that are already
part of [EU] legislation”); see also Valdés & McCann, supra note 8, at 39 (noting
“‘exports’ [of countries’] domestic regulatory regimes to trading partners”).
121. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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may simply defend their current national IP law because the law is the
result of a democratic process; when laws result from a democratic
process, it is a legitimate position to contend that those laws should
remain intact after an FTA is signed.
For some negotiators, FTA negotiations may be an opportunity to
effectuate changes in their own national law and achieve IP law
objectives that the executive branch could not achieve domestically
because of opposition from or reluctance by the national legislature
and courts. Regardless of the intensity of the reporting to and the
feedback from the national legislature during FTA negotiations, there
are opportunities for negotiators to steer negotiations toward the
outcomes that they desire.122 And regardless of how the executive
branch presents the results of the negotiations to the public, the results
might be a silent victory for the negotiators and any stakeholders who
lobbied for that result.
In the end, a country’s negotiating position in IP law is likely to be a
patchwork of various interests in and pressures for different outcomes.
Not every move of the negotiators is necessarily choreographed to
please lobbyists, just as not every move of the negotiators is necessarily
designed to please everyone—or even most interests—in their country.
Inevitably, positions and outcomes will please some and displease
others, and there will never be only winners in international treaty
negotiations.
B.

Examples of Positive FTA IP Provisions and Features

Keeping in mind the caveats mentioned in the previous Section
about the meaning of “positive” in the context of international treaties,
this Section presents FTA IP provisions and features that can be
interpreted as overall pluses in TRIPS-plus developments and can
inspire future negotiations.
Critics are likely to identify at least some negative aspects in the
provisions and features below; indeed, even the most benign-sounding
FTA provision might have been designed with calculated intent, and
122. On the problem of democratic deficit in FTA negotiations see Carlo Tovo, The
Role of National Parliaments in the Negotiation and Conclusion of EU Free Trade Agreements,
in THE CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 125, 125–42
(Isabelle Bosse-Platière & Cécile Rapoport eds., 2019). On the problem of democratic
deficit at the EU level see Josiane Auvret-Finck, The European Parliament and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, in THE CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 143, 143–58 (Isabelle Bosse-Platière & Cécile Rapoport
eds., 2019).
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every beneficial feature may, even if only in uncommon circumstances,
produce disadvantages and result in unintended consequences.123
Beneficial effects depend on the circumstances and implementation;
without suitable circumstances and appropriate implementation, a
provision with a beneficial potential might not produce positive effects.
And even when positive developments follow the implementation of
an FTA, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the FTA IP provisions on
such developments, as several studies have demonstrated.124
A few notes are in order about the use of FTAs in this Section: This
Section does not present an exhaustive list of all FTAs that include
each provision that the Section mentions; rather, the Section refers to
selected examples of the various provisions. Because it does not cover
all provisions in any of the FTAs it mentions, the Section should not be
taken to present the full scope of any of the FTAs. Also, no particular
significance should be attached to any omission of an FTA from the
lists of examples; this Article is based on a review of all 211 FTAs with
IP provisions in force,125 and listing all FTAs with a particular provision
would create an unwieldly list. In many cases multiple, FTAs could be
listed as examples for many provisions because countries replicate FTA
texts; the repeated use of various FTA texts as templates for future
FTAs results in identical or similar provisions appearing in multiple
FTAs.126
123. For example, an extension of the scope of a grace period for patent
applications may be interpreted as beneficial (to the patent applicant) or as
detrimental (to the public domain). E.g., Morocco-U.S. FTA, supra note 66, art.
15.9(8); Bahrain-U.S. FTA, supra note 66, art. 14.8(8); Australia-Malaysia FTA, supra
note 68, art. 13.11(2); Australia-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 13.8(5); CPTPP, supra
note 66, art. 18.38; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.37.
124. See supra note 8; cf. Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus Protection and
Impacts in Latin America, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 141, 178 (Daniel
J. Gervais, 2d ed. 2014) (noting that “[t]here is very little evidence so far about the
impact of IPRs on variables such as investment and technology transfer, but several
studies point to considerable costs derived from the implementation of higher
standards of protection”).
125. These are FTAs that have been notified to the WTO, are in force, and include
IP provisions. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. This Section does not
provide a historical overview and therefore does not mention provisions in FTAs that
are no longer in force, such as NAFTA.
126. On the use of FTAs as templates see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Because of the use of templates, it is possible to order FTAs into clusters. The most
recent cluster comprises the U.K. FTAs that the United Kingdom concluded in
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This Section focuses on TRIPS-plus provisions—provisions that
enhance or complement the standards included in TRIPS. This
Section assumes that countries that enter into future FTAs would
already be bound by TRIPS and its standards, which would therefore
not need to be repeated in the FTAs. In some places, this Section
mentions additional multilateral IP treaties that concern some of the
matters discussed here.
1.

Transparency
Many FTAs include provisions that seek to enhance the transparency
of countries’ IP systems, which is a beneficial goal that is important
from international, national, and transnational perspectives.127
Internationally, transparency is important to countries’ relations
because it enables countries to monitor the implementation of treaty
obligations and the continued compliance with treaty requirements.
Greater information is also useful for analyzing the functioning of the
national systems and assessing future proposals for reform.128
Within each country, transparency contributes to the safeguarding
of due process; it ensures that applicants, rights holders, and third
parties have access to information that is essential for the acquisition,
maintenance, and enforcement of IP rights. Transparency plays an
important role in establishing and preserving the appropriate balance
between IP rights and other rights; for example, publications of IP
rights applications for purposes of opposition—to enable third parties
to oppose a grant or registration of the rights—are important for
enforcing pre-existing rights and maintaining the public domain.129
For transnational IP dealings, international treaties, including FTAs,
can provide “transparency about transparency.” By setting minimum
transparency standards, the treaties ensure that parties who engage in
transnational IP dealings have access to information about countries’
IP law systems. This information can be very helpful to foreign parties
who might lack local knowledge and expertise and be disadvantaged
by their limited ability to navigate countries’ IP law systems. A local
connection with Brexit; they include, e.g., the 2020 FTAs that the United Kingdom
concluded with Japan and Ukraine.
127. This Section does not discuss the issue of the perceived lack of transparency of
FTA negotiations. See supra note 78.
128. See Taubman, supra note 62, at 41 (pointing out that “seasoned practical
understanding of domestic regulatory systems [including] IP enforcement . . . is vital
for the creation of realistic and balanced international standards”).
129. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.15(2).
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knows the ins and outs of obtaining a particular piece of information;
a foreigner might be left in the dark. FTAs can assist in mitigating this
indirect discrimination that might otherwise arise from a lack of
transparency about transparency.
Transparency-enhancing provisions should be welcome elements of
FTAs, but even generally beneficial transparency provisions might
create challenges. Transparency requirements can result in increased
costs for countries if the requirements obligate countries to create new
workflows, platforms, and controls. Attendant costs fall on the
individual parties to an FTA and can be significantly burdensome for
developing countries.130 In some countries, publication of certain
information might cause data protection/privacy concerns, and the
consequent need to redact documents before their publication, and
take additional privacy-protecting measures increases transparency
costs for the countries. Translation costs may be an issue if an FTA
requirement calls for publication in a particular language.
TRIPS’s main transparency provision, Article 63, requires that
countries ensure the publication of, or where publication is not
practicable, the making available of, “in a national language,” the
“[l]aws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administrative
rulings of general application, made effective by a Member pertaining
to the subject matter of [TRIPS].”131 The publication requirement also
extends to agreements. Countries have an obligation to notify their
laws and regulations to the TRIPS Council132 and, upon request from
another country, supply specifically requested judicial decisions,
administrative rulings, and bilateral agreements.133 In the trademark
section, TRIPS requires countries to publish trademarks for
opposition.134 For enforcement decisions on the merits, TRIPS Article
41(3) requires that such decisions “be made available at least to the
parties to the proceeding without undue delay.”135
Many existing FTAs include transparency-enhancing provisions that
fill the space that TRIPS left unfilled. The degree of detail of the
existing provisions varies; the most basic transparency provisions in
FTAs simply declare the countries’ general commitment to
130. Technical assistance from other countries or international or regional
organizations may offset some of the costs.
131. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 63(1).
132. Id. art. 63(2).
133. Id. art. 63(3).
134. Id. art. 15(5).
135. Id. art. 41(3).
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transparency. For example, Australia and Chile in their FTA “recognise
that it is important to . . . promote efficient and transparent
intellectual property systems.”136 The Malaysia-New Zealand FTA states
that “[e]ach Party is committed to the maintenance of transparent
intellectual property rights regimes and systems,”137 and several FTAs,
including the China-Peru FTA and the Korea-New Zealand FTA,
require countries to “establish and maintain transparent intellectual
property rights regimes and systems.”138 On the other end of the
spectrum in terms of comprehensiveness might be the pre-TRIPS
Canada-Israel FTA, which includes a separate annex with Guidelines
on Transparency in Intellectual Property.139
Some FTAs include a requirement concerning the availability of at least
some information in a particular language. The ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand FTA requires that all laws and regulations be made available “in
at least the national language of that Party or in the English language,”140
and that the countries “endeavour to make the information . . . available
in the English language.”141 Under the Australia-Hong Kong FTA, the
countries must ensure that the laws and regulations are published or
made publicly available in English;142 the provision in this FTA from 2019
was perhaps prompted by concerns about the continued use of the
English language in Hong Kong.
Some FTAs specifically address the possibility of making available on
the internet the information that TRIPS requires.143 The Chile-U.S
FTA and the CAFTA-DR in 2003 and 2004, respectively, clarified in a
footnote that the countries “may satisfy the requirement for
publication [of all laws, regulations, and procedures concerning the
protection or enforcement of IP rights] by making the [documents]
available to the public on the Internet.”144 In 2009, the ASEAN
countries and Australia and New Zealand committed in their FTA to
136. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Chile, art. 17.2, July 30, 2008, 2695 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Australia-Chile FTA]; see EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.6(1).
137. Free Trade Agreement, Malay.-N.Z., art. 11.2(3), Oct. 26, 2009, 2724 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Malaysia-New Zealand FTA].
138. China-Peru FTA, supra note 51, art. 144(5); Korea-New Zealand FTA, supra
note 67, art. 11.3(6)(b).
139. Canada-Israel FTA, supra note 34, Annex 10.7.
140. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13.
141. Id. ch. 13, art. 10(2).
142. Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.7(1).
143. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 63(1).
144. Chile-U.S. FTA, supra note 56, art. 17.1(12) n.2; CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art.
15.1(14) n.4.
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“endeavour to make the information [about laws and regulations of
general application that pertain to the availability, scope, acquisition,
enforcement and prevention of the abuse of IP rights] . . . available . .
.on the internet.”145 Even recent treaties, such as the 2018 Australia-Peru
FTA, the 2018 CPTPP, and the 2018 USMCA, do not mandate, but at
least expect, countries to “endeavor” to publish the information on the
internet.146 As for final judicial and administrative decisions,147 the 2004
CAFTA-DR explains in a separate footnote that countries may satisfy
their obligation to make such decisions public by publishing the
decisions on the internet,148 while the 2008 Australia-Chile FTA
expresses the parties’ preference for electronic publication of
decisions.149
FTAs may clarify or broaden the scope of information that countries
must publish. The Canada-Israel FTA requires the publication of “the
examination guidelines and assessment criteria, if any, used to review
an application” and “the contact points for inquiries regarding the
registration of industrial property rights.”150 The FTA intends that the
information be specific and user-friendly when it states that the
countries must publish “clear and simple instructions and explanations
of the steps involved regarding the application, issuance and
registration processes” and also “the provisions, if any, directed to
small and medium sized enterprises.”151 The CAFTA-DR includes
specific and detailed provisions on transparency concerning
geographical indications; the countries must inter alia provide
“available contact information sufficient to allow . . . the general public
to obtain guidance concerning the procedures for filing applications
or petitions and the processing of those applications or petitions in
general.”152
With respect to particular IP rights, FTAs may strive to improve the
accessibility of information about granted and registered IP rights. The
EU-Japan FTA contains the countries’ commitment to “make all
reasonable efforts to take appropriate available measures to publish
145. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13, art. 10(2).
146. USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.9, para. 1; see also Australia-Peru FTA, supra note
67, art. 19, paras. 1–2; CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.9, para. 1.
147. See TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 63, para. 1.
148. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11, para. 3 n.16.
149. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.34, para. 2.
150. Canada-Israel FTA, supra note 34, Annex 10.7, paras. 1(b)–(c).
151. Id. Annex 10.7, paras. 1(a)–(d).
152. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.3, para. 6.
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information” on grants and registrations of IP rights.153 The ASEAN
countries and Australia and New Zealand promise to “endeavour to
co-operate . . . by developing publicly accessible databases of
registered rights.”154 The Australia-Chile FTA requires the countries to
provide, “to the maximum extent practical,” “a publicly available
electronic information system of registered trade marks,”155 and the
EU-Georgia FTA and the EU-Singapore FTA include the requirement
without any qualification.156
Gradually, FTAs have shown countries’ readiness to move
publication of the information about granted and registered IP rights
to the internet. The 2004 Australia-U.S. FTA was ahead of other FTAs
when it made publication on the internet mandatory, but only in cases
of trademark databases (of both applications and registrations).157 The
2018 CPTPP and the 2018 USMCA have replicated this provision158 and
added an obligation for the countries to publish online information
about other types of registered or granted IP rights, but only subject to
the countries’ laws.159 The 2012 Australia-Malaysia FTA states that
“[p]atent and trade mark databases will be made available on the
Internet,”160 and the 2015 Australia-China FTA and the 2017
China-Georgia FTA require the countries to make their “granted or
registered patent for invention, utility model, industrial design,
plant variety protection, geographical indication and trade mark
databases available on the internet.”161
Some FTAs address the accessibility of information regarding not
only registered and granted IP rights, but also IP rights applications.
The degree and scope of countries’ commitments vary; many FTAs
include provisions concerning trademarks and require countries to
“provide a publicly available electronic database of trademark
153. EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.6, para. 3(a).
154. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13, art. 9, para. 4.
155. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.14(b).
156. EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 166, para. 3; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note
73, art. 10.13.
157. Australia-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.2(8)(b).
158. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.24(b); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.23(b).
159. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.9, para. 3; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.9, para.
3.
160. Australia-Malaysia FTA, supra note 68, art. 13.6.
161. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-China, art. 11.6, para. 1, June 17, 2015,
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/chafta-agreement-text.pdf [hereinafter
Australia-China FTA]; see also China-Georgia FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.10; see also
Georgia-Hong Kong FTA supra note 67, ch. 11, art. 10.
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applications and trademark registrations.”162 Some FTAs ask countries
to “endeavour” to make the databases available on the internet;163 the
Australia-China FTA, the CPTPP, and the USMCA expand the
obligation to databases of applications for other types of IP rights.164
FTAs may specify the kind of information that must be made
available regarding applied-for and registered or granted IP rights.
The CPTPP and the USMCA list specific types of information about
patent applications and granted patents that the countries must make
available to the public, namely search and examination results,
including prior art searches, non-confidential communications from
applicants, and citations to literature submitted by applicants and third
parties.165
Finally, in some FTAs, parties commit to improving the public’s
awareness of IP law, which may be subsumed under the transparency
heading. Some FTAs mention awareness of “intellectual property
rights and systems,”166 awareness of the “protection of intellectual
property,”167 or awareness of “the benefits of effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”168 These phrases might
suggest a rather one-sided approach to IP awareness, with an emphasis
on only the pro-IP protection perspective. However, it is certainly
desirable for awareness-raising activities to encompass the entire IP
rights ecosystem, including the use of public licenses and the
minimization of potential abuses and the elimination of actual abuses
162. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 204, para. 2; Korea-New
Zealand FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.8, para. 8; Free Trade Agreement Between the
European Union and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, art. 12.19, para. 3, June 30,
2019, 2020 O.J. (L 186) 3 [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA]; see also EU-CARIFORUM
FTA, supra note 70, art. 144(A); Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.14,
para. 2(b); cf. Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.9, para. 10 (requiring that the
countries “provide, to the extent possible, a publicly available electronic information
system of trademark applications and registered trademarks” (emphasis added)).
163. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13, art. 10, para. 3; see
also CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.2, para. 7 (stating that a party shall “work to
provide, to the maximum degree practical, a publicly available electronic database”).
164. See Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.6, para. 2; CPTPP, supra note
66, art. 18.9, para. 2; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.9, para. 2.
165. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.45; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.43.
166. Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., art. 164, para. 2(c)(i), Apr. 7, 2008, 2590
U.N.T.S. 101, 325–26 [hereinafter China-New Zealand FTA].
167. Agreement for an Economic Partnership, Brunei-Japan, art. 97(f), June 18,
2007, 2781 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Brunei-Japan FTA]; EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70,
art. 14.7.
168. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13, art. 9, para. 5.
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of IP rights. Even when the phrasing in an FTA is more neutral, such
as “awareness-building activities for the private sector and civil
society”169 or “promotion of public awareness of consumers and right
holders,”170 the content of the actual activities is ultimately what
matters.
2.

Cooperation among IP offices
FTAs may usefully promote cooperation among national IP offices;
depending on their implementation, provisions to encourage and
enhance collaboration among IP offices may be among the most
beneficial FTA provisions. Some aspects of collaboration among IP
offices are set out in TRIPS Article 69, but Article 69 is narrow and
addresses collaboration only as concerns cross-border trade in
IP-infringing goods. Much space remains in this area for beneficial
TRIPS-plus initiatives.
FTAs may include general language requiring countries to
“encourage and facilitate the development of contacts and
cooperation” among national IP offices, and possibly among other
agencies and institutions.171 Some FTAs express goals for the
cooperation; for example, the Australia-Thailand FTA mentions
“improving and strengthening the intellectual property administrative
systems”;172 Chile and China agreed in their FTA to “promote the
efficient registration of intellectual property rights.”173
Collaboration among IP offices, including in prior art searches, may
be facilitated by the adoption of uniform classifications, and in some
FTAs, countries pledge to use a specific classification system, such as
the classifications based on the Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the
169. Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Community
and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Chile, of the Other Part,
art. 32, para. 2(e), Nov. 18, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 352) 3 [hereinafter EU-Chile FTA].
170. Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States,
of the One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part, art. 10.69, para. 1(e),
Oct. 6, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 127) 6 [hereinafter EU-Korea FTA]; see also EU-Ukraine
FTA, supra note 69, art. 252, para. 2(e) (“public awareness of consumers and right
holders”).
171. Australia-Thailand FTA, supra note 35, art. 1305(b); Malaysia-New Zealand
FTA, supra note 137, art. 11.4, para. 2(c).
172. Australia-Thailand FTA, supra note 35, art. 1305(b)(i).
173. Free Trade Agreement, Chile-China, art. 111, para. 1(f), Nov. 18, 2005,
http://investmentpolicy.unctagd.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/2712/download [https://perma.cc/5FKP-3LWJ] [hereinafter Chile-China
FTA].
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International Patent Classification and the Nice Agreement
Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks.174
Important collaboration efforts concern patent examination by
national patent offices, including the process of examination of
“international” patent applications under the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT). In recent years, patent offices have successfully
enhanced collaboration through mechanisms such as the Patent
Prosecution Highway (PPH), and provisions in FTAs, though not a
precondition of such collaboration, may be a useful starting point for
further negotiations leading to a PPH project or another type of closer
collaboration.
FTAs may address collaboration in prior art searches and in patent
examination in general. For example, in its FTAs with Singapore and
India, Korea agreed to possible cooperation in “international search
and international preliminary examination under PCT, and
facilitation of international patenting process.”175 India and Korea
agreed to possible cooperation in “joint prior art search, including
exchanging prior art search result[s], comparing search result[s], and
reviewing differences of search result[s].”176 The CPTPP and the
USMCA countries agreed to the goal of “making search and
examination results available to the patent offices of [the] other
[countries].”177 China and Korea have agreed to “enhance
cooperation” concerning accelerated examinations of patent
applications.178

174. See Chile-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 159, para. 2 (requiring the use of
classifications for patents and utility models pursuant to the Strasbourg Agreement);
EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 204, para. 1 (relying on the
classification established in the Nice Agreement to classify goods and services for
trademarks); CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.25 (implementing the classifications from
the Nice Agreement); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.24 (using the classifications
consistent with the Nice Agreement); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162, art. 12.17,
para. 2 (applying the classifications of the Nice Agreement).
175. India-Korea FTA, supra note 36, art. 12.5, para. 2(b); see also Free Trade
Agreement, S. Kor.-Sing., art. 17.5, para. 2(a), Aug. 4, 2005,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/2709/download [hereinafter Korea-Singapore FTA].
176. India-Korea FTA, supra note 36, art. 12.5, para. 2(c).
177. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.14, para. 2(a); see also USMCA, supra note 66, art.
20.15, para. 2(a).
178. China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.15, para. 5.
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FTAs may even detail forms of delegation and recognition of patent
examination. According to the Japan-Singapore FTA, “Singapore
shall, in accordance with its laws and regulations, take appropriate
measures to facilitate the patenting process of an application filed in
Singapore that corresponds to an application filed in Japan.”179 The
Indonesia-Japan FTA requires that the countries provide preferential
examination to patent applications that were filed in the other country or
some other country.180 In its FTA with Korea, Singapore agreed to
designate the Korean IP office as the patent office for examining any
“patent application filed in Singapore that corresponds to a patent
application filed in Korea,”181 and also as a PCT International Search
Authority and International Preliminary Examination Authority for any
English-language patent application filed in Singapore’s IP office.182
Several FTAs evidence countries’ concerns about the quality of
patent examination. Australia and China pledged to “consider
opportunities for continuing cooperation” regarding not only “work
sharing in patent examination,” but also “improvement of patent
examination quality and efficiency.”183 The CPTPP and the USMCA
include the countries’ commitment to “exchang[e] [ . . . ] information
on quality assurance systems and quality standards relating to patent
examination.”184
Other potentially useful forms of collaboration that are mentioned
in FTAs are “training and specialization courses for public servants on
intellectual property rights and other mechanisms”185 and technical
assistance.
3.

Procedural minima for administrative and judicial proceedings
Provisions setting procedural minima may also be positive features
of FTAs, particularly when the provisions are designed to align
procedures with the principles of due process. With these provisions,

179. Japan-Singapore FTA, supra note 51, art. 98, para. 1. The details of the process
are in the Implementing Agreement. Id. art. 7.
180. Indonesia-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 112, paras. 3–4.
181. Korea-Singapore FTA, supra note 175, art. 17.7.
182. Id. art. 17.6, para. 1.
183. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.23, paras. 3(a)–(d).
184. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.14, para. 2(b); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.15,
para. 2(b); see also infra note 373 and accompanying text (discussing the quality of
patent examination).
185. Chile-China FTA, supra note 173, art. 111, para. 2(b); see also China-New
Zealand FTA, supra note 166, art. 164, para. 2.
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as with the transparency provisions discussed in Section III.B.1, above,
negative effects may accrue; primarily, countries may experience
increased costs as they reform their institutions and adjust their
processes to comport to the FTA-required procedural minima.
Nevertheless, the provisions should lead to improvements that are
beneficial overall.
TRIPS provides a solid basis for procedural minima for
administrative procedures associated with the acquisition and
maintenance of IP rights; according to TRIPS Article 62, which
concerns the “acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property
rights and related inter-partes procedures,” procedures and formalities
must be reasonable and consistent with TRIPS.186 Grants and
registrations of IP rights must occur “within a reasonable period of
time so as to avoid unwarranted curtailment of the period of
protection.”187 All procedures for acquisition and maintenance of IP
rights and for any administrative revocation and inter partes
procedures (opposition, revocation, or cancellation) that might be
available under national laws must conform to the general principles
and be fair, equitable, and “not . . . unnecessarily complicated or
costly,” and not “entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted
delays.”188 Decisions on the merits rendered in such procedures “shall
preferably be . . . in writing and reasoned,” “based only on evidence in
respect of which parties were offered the opportunity to be heard,”
made available to the parties “without undue delay,” and be “subject to
review by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority.”189
For IP rights enforcement procedures, TRIPS Articles 41 and 42 list
several due process requirements that apply to judicial proceedings
and other types of IP rights enforcement procedures, such as border
measures undertaken by customs. Enforcement procedures must be
effective and provide for “expeditious remedies” while safeguarding
against the abuse of procedures and not creating “barriers to
legitimate trade.”190 The procedures must be “fair and equitable,” and
they must not be “unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.”191 Defendants must
186. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 62, para. 1.
187. Id. art. 62, para. 2.
188. Id. art. 41, para. 2; id. art. 62, para. 2.
189. Id. art. 41, para. 3; id. art. 62, paras. 4–5; see also id. art. 32 (concerning “judicial
review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent”).
190. Id. art. 41, para. 1.
191. Id. art. 41, para. 2.
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receive timely notice with sufficient details, and parties must be given
the opportunity to be represented by “independent legal counsel.”192
The procedures should not be “overly burdensome” in terms of
requiring personal appearances, and parties must be allowed to
“substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence.”193 The
procedures must allow for the protection of confidential information
“unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional
requirements.”194 The rules that apply to decisions on IP rights
enforcement also apply to decisions on acquisition and maintenance
of IP rights with respect to the writing requirement, the reasoning
requirement, and the availability of review.
TRIPS does not require countries to create a separate judicial system
for IP rights enforcement or prioritization of IP rights enforcement
over other types of enforcement.195 Each country may create
specialized IP courts, adopt separate procedural rules for IP rights
proceedings, and channel greater resources to enforcement of IP
rights than to enforcement of other rights.196
Although TRIPS’s treatment of procedural minima is quite
extensive, additional space is left for FTAs to fill. For example, the
various transparency provisions discussed in Section III.B.1, above,
whether they concern laws, regulations, and decisions, or individual
applications for and registration and grants of particular IP rights, all
contribute to the safeguarding of due process.
Some FTAs focus on the details of the patent application, revocation,
and invalidation processes, and the details of the trademark
application, opposition, and invalidation processes.197 The Patent Law
Treaty (PLT) addresses some of the procedural aspects of patent
acquisition; the PLT was signed in 2000, entered into force in 2005,
and currently has forty-three contracting parties for which the PLT has
entered into force.198 For trademarks, the Trademark Law Treaty
192. Id. art. 42.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. art. 41, para. 5.
196. See Patent Law Treaty, art. 10, para. 3, Jan. 6, 2000, 2340 U.N.T.S. 3.
197. See Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.13.
198. See WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties: Patent Law Treaty,
W ORLD I NTELL . P ROP . O RG . , https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/
ShowResults?search_what=C&treaty_id=4 [https://perma.cc/F9RQ-ANA6] (last
visited April 15, 2022) (listing all contracting parties to the Patent Law Treaty).
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(TLT) and the subsequent Singapore Treaty on the Law of
Trademarks (Singapore Treaty) provide for many details of the
trademark application process. The TLT was signed in 1994 and has
fifty-four parties,199 and the Singapore Treaty was signed in 2006 and
has fifty-one parties. These three treaties refer to procedures in
national patent and trademark offices that concern national IP rights;
additional treaties cover procedures concerning international
applications and regional rights, and they address aspects of due
process in those procedures.200
FTAs often aim at the efficiency of IP grant and registration
procedures. For instance, in the Chile-Japan FTA and the Brunei-Japan
FTA, the countries declare their readiness to ensure transparent and
streamlined administrative procedures concerning IP;201 references to
the streamlining of IP administrative procedures are also in Japan’s
FTAs with India and Australia.202 FTAs may include countries’
commitments to enhance IP registration systems and improve
examination procedures, including quality systems;203 for example,
Hong Kong’s FTAs with Georgia and Australia specify that such
The PLT obligates countries to give a patent owner “the opportunity to make
observations on the intended revocation or invalidation, and to make amendments
and corrections where permitted under the applicable law, within a reasonable time
limit.” Patent Law Treaty, supra note 196, art. 10, para. 2. Concerning patent
applications, the PLT requires that countries permit, upon request, a patent applicant
to correct or add a priority claim and that countries provide an applicant the
opportunity to make observations before such a request is denied. Id. art. 13, para. 1.
199. WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties: Trademark Law Treaty, WORLD
INTELL . PROP . ORG ., https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
treaties/en/documents/pdf/tlt.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LZR-4EZL] (listing all the
contracting parties to the Trademark Law Treaty).
200. See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645,
http:// www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf; Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks of April 14, 1891, as revised at Brussels on
December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6,
1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Nice on June 15, 1957 and at Stockholm on July
14, 1967, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389; European Patent Convention, supra note 68,
at 199.
201. Chile-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 159, para. 1; Brunei-Japan FTA, supra note
167, art. 97(d).
202. See Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, India-Japan, art. 103,
Feb. 16, 2011, 2862 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement for an Economic Partnership, Austl.-Japan,
art.
16.4,
July
8,
2014,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044322.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3RM-HXUC].
203. Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.9(a); China-Georgia FTA,
supra note 67, art. 11.7(a).
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improvements should occur “with a view to achieving efficient and
timely grant or registration of intellectual property rights.”204 The
CPTPP includes the countries’ commitment to “cooperate to reduce
differences in the procedures and processes of their respective patent
offices” and thus to “reduce the complexity and cost of obtaining the
grant of a patent.”205
Sometimes FTAs go beyond general language and seek to cement
specific procedural requirements. The CAFTA-DR requires the
countries to provide patent applicants “with at least one opportunity
to submit amendments, corrections, and observations in connection
with their applications.”206 Later FTAs, for example the provisions in
China’s FTAs with Australia and Georgia (later replicated in Hong
Kong’s FTAs with the same countries), mandate “opportunities to
make amendments, corrections and observations in connection with
their applications in accordance with each [country’s] laws,
regulations and rules.”207 The Canada-Israel FTA encompasses
additional IP rights in these requirements and mandates for any
refusals to register a trademark or design or grant a patent “the
opportunity to respond to communications from the relevant
government authorities, challenge an initial refusal and have a higher
authority review any refusal to register a trademark or design, or grant
a patent.”208 The EU-Georgia FTA specifies that an opposition
procedure must be available for trademarks and must be adversarial.209
FTAs may contribute to an increased digitization of processes; as
noted in Section III.B.1, above, some FTAs require or encourage
countries to maintain electronic databases of registered and granted
rights and IP rights applications, and some FTAs address the electronic
nature of processes other than publication. For example, in the
CAFTA-DR and the Australia-Chile FTA, the countries commit to
“provide, to the maximum extent practical: a system for the electronic

204. Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.9, para. 1(a); see also GeorgiaHong Kong FTA, supra note 67, ch. 11, art. 7, para. 1(a) (requiring that each party
shall work to improve its examination and registration systems).
205. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.14, para. 3.
206. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.9, para. 8.
207. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.10; China-Georgia FTA, supra note
67, art. 11.9; Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, ch. 11, art. 9; see also AustraliaHong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.9, para. 2 (“in accordance with the laws and
regulations of that [country]”).
208. Canada-Israel FTA, supra note 34, Annex 10.7, paras. 2(a)–(b).
209. EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 166.
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application, processing, registration, and maintenance of trade
marks”;210 the China-Korea FTA does not include such a qualification
and requires that the countries provide such a system in an electronic
format.211 The CPTPP and USMCA require “a system for the electronic
application for, and maintenance” of not only trademarks, but also
industrial design rights.212 The format of decisions is also the subject of
some FTA provisions; a number of FTAs permit electronic delivery of
trademark registration refusals,213 and the 2015 Australia-China FTA
simply includes in the definition of “writing” any “writing and
communications in an electronic form.”214
FTAs may assist in easing the administrative burden on IP applicants.
For example, the Indonesia-Japan FTA prohibits the countries from
requiring the authentication of signatures under certain
circumstances, requiring the certification of translation of an earlier
application, requiring separate powers of attorney for each application
or registration, and requiring the submission of a power of attorney as
a condition of the filing of an application.215 The Japan-Thailand FTA
includes a commitment to assist small and medium enterprises with
the acquisition of IP rights, including, possibly, by reducing fees.216
Some FTAs include a provision concerning standing to oppose the
grant or registration of an IP right or to seek the revocation,
cancellation, or invalidation of an IP right. FTAs typically require that

210. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.14(a); see also CAFTA-DR, supra
note 67, art. 15.2, para. 7.
211. See China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.14, para. 2(a).
212. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.24(a); USMCA, supra note 66, arts. 20.23(a),
20.54(a).
213. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.2, para. 6; Australia-Chile FTA, supra note
136, art. 17.13(a); Tratado de Libre Comercio [Free Trade Agreement],
Costa Rica-Peru, art. 9.3, para. 4(a), May 26, 2011, https://www.sice.oas.org/
Trade/CRI_PER_FTA_s/TEXT_CRI_PER_PDF_s/index_s.asp
[https://perma.cc/5BB3-2BN2] [hereinafter Costa Rica-Peru FTA]; Tratado de Libre
Comercio [Free Trade Agreement], Colom.-Costa Rica, art. 9.3, para. 4(a), May 22,
2013, https://www.tlc.gov.co/acuerdos/vigente/costa-rica/texto-del-acuerdo-espanol
[https://perma.cc/FS4F-J857] [hereinafter Colombia-Costa Rica FTA]; Canada-Korea
FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.9, para. 8; Korea-New Zealand FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.4,
para. 8; China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.14, para. 1(a).
214. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.9(e).
215. Indonesia-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 109.
216. Agreement for an Economic Partnership, Japan-Thai., art. 142, Apr. 3, 2007,
2752 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Japan-Thailand FTA].
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countries afford standing to “any interested person,”217 but they differ
in the types of IP rights their standing provisions cover. For example,
the 2007 Chile-Japan FTA includes a standing provision only for
trademarks;218 the 2015 Australia-Chile FTA and the 2017
China-Georgia FTA provisions on standing concern IP rights in
general.219
Some FTAs build on TRIPS enforcement provisions by specifying the
party having standing to enforce IP rights. In addition to IP rights
holders, the EU-CARIFORUM FTA, the EU-Georgia FTA, the
EU-Moldova FTA, and the EU-Canada FTA all list a number of other
persons who have standing, but only when the persons are entitled to
seek relief according to the country’s law; such persons are “other
persons authorised to use those rights,” “intellectual property
collective rights management bodies,” and “professional defence
bodies that are regularly recognised as having a right to represent
holders of intellectual property rights.”220 The EU-Singapore FTA says
that the term “right holders” includes “exclusive licensees as well as
federations and associations having the legal standing to assert such
rights.”221
Some FTAs include provisions concerning the costs of experts that
may be appointed in judicial or administrative proceedings. According
to the CAFTA-DR and the Australia-Korea FTA, if experts are
appointed by the authorities in civil proceedings and it is “require[d]
that the parties [to the proceedings] bear the costs of such experts, the
[countries] should seek to ensure that such costs are closely related,

217. Canada-Israel FTA, supra note 34, Annex 10.7, paras. 2(c)–(d) 67; see also
CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.2, para. 6(c) (“interested parties”); Chile-Japan FTA,
supra note 70, art. 161 (“interested parties”); Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, arts.
17.13(c), 17.21, para. 1 (“interested parties”); Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art.
11.9(c) (“interested parties”); Korea-New Zealand FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.4, para.
11 (“interested parties”); China-Georgia FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.7(c) (“interested
parties”); Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.9, para. 1(c) (“interested
parties”); Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, ch. 11, art. 7, para. 1(c) (“interested
parties”).
218. See Chile-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 161.
219. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.9(c); China-Georgia FTA, supra
note 67, art. 11.7(c); Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.9, para. 1(c);
Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 7, para. 1(c).
220. EU-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 70, art. 152; EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69,
art. 191; EU-Moldova FTA, supra note 69, art. 319; EU-Canada FTA, supra note 51, art.
20.33.
221. EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 73, art. 10.38, para. 2(a).
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inter alia, to the quantity and nature of work to be performed and [ . . .
] not unreasonably deter recourse to such proceedings.”222 The CPTPP
and USMCA require that expert fees be “reasonable and related
appropriately, among other things, to the quantity and nature of work
to be performed and [ . . . ] not unreasonably deter recourse to such
proceedings.”223 The Australia-Chile FTA lists “standardised fees” as an
acceptable alternative for the calculation of expert remuneration.224
Some FTAs expand the TRIPS requirements concerning decisions
to be in writing and to include reasoning. Under the CAFTA-DR, the
Australia-Hong Kong FTA, and the CPTPP, final decisions should not
only include reasoning but also “state any relevant findings of fact . . .
on which the decisions . . . are based.”225 The inclusion of factual
findings may be helpful, for example, if parties seek collateral estoppel
effects in other proceedings.226 Some FTAs specify that as an alternative
to the reasons for a decision, the decision-maker may state the legal
basis on which the decision is based.227
Some countries have used FTAs to boost their protection of
geographical indications, and their FTAs include procedural
provisions designed specifically for geographical indications. For
example, the CAFTA-DR includes several procedural requirements
concerning geographical indications, including a requirement for
minimal formalities, a publication for opposition, and the availability
of procedures for opposition and cancellation of geographical
222. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11, para. 16; see also Australia-Korea FTA,
supra note 67, art. 13.9, para. 14.
223. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.74, para. 11; see also USMCA, supra note 66, art.
20.82, para. 11.
224. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.36, para. 6.
225. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11, para. 3; CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.73,
para. 1(a); Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.7, para. 2 (“Each [country]
shall provide that final judicial decisions or administrative rulings for the enforcement
of intellectual property rights, that in accordance with the laws of the [country] are of
general applicability, shall preferably be in writing and state any relevant findings of
fact and the reasoning, or the legal basis on which the decisions or rulings are based.”).
226. See, e.g., Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 272–73 (2d
Cir. 1999).
227. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11, para. 3; Australia-Chile FTA, supra note
136, art. 17.34, para. 2; Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.7, para. 2
(“Each [country] shall provide that final judicial decisions or administrative rulings
for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, that in accordance with the laws of
the [country] are of general applicability, shall preferably be in writing and state any
relevant findings of fact and the reasoning, or the legal basis on which the decisions
or rulings are based.”).
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indications.228 The Australia-Hong Kong FTA requires the publication
for opposition in cases of applied-for geographical indications.229
4.

Limitations on increases in IP protection
FTAs may be, and have been, used to raise minimum standards of IP
protection; as Frankel observed, even a clarification of a TRIPS
requirement may have resulted in an increase in IP protection.230
However, TRIPS-plus also has been used to place limits on future increases
in IP protection; Straus terms such provisions as “TRIPs-minus.”231 TRIPS
itself is a treaty that has lowered a pre-existing IP protection standard;
the WTO panel, in one of its decisions, interpreted the TRIPS
provision on exceptions and limitations to copyright as permitting
exceptions and limitations to rights under the pre-existing Berne
Convention.232
FTAs may emphasize countries’ commitments to seek an
appropriate balance between IP rights and other rights and may specify
the rights and interests that should be balanced. FTAs now frequently
mention “the legitimate interests of users,”233 and some FTAs add “the
228. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.3.
229. Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.11(2)(a).
230. See Frankel supra note 71, at 103.
231. Straus, supra note 5, at 197; see also Correa, supra note 60, at 182–83.
232. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of U.S. Copyright Act, WTO Doc.
WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000) [hereinafter U.S. Copyright Act Section 110(5)];
TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 13. For a discussion of the “minor exception” doctrine in this
report see U.S. Copyright Act Section 110(5), supra, at para. 6.82; KENNEDY, supra note 56,
at 194–95; see also General Report, Records of the Conference Convened in Brussels
5–26 June 1948, reprinted in RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 256–70.
233. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, 2005, art. 10.2(2),
May 28, 2006, 2592 U.N.T.S. 46151 [hereinafter TPSEP]; Malaysia-Pakistan FTA, supra
note 51, art. 104(2); Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.2; Free Trade
Agreement,
China-Costa
Rica,
art.
109(2),
Apr.
8,
2010,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CRI_CHN_FTA/Texts_Apr2010_e/
CRI_CHN_ToC__PDF_e.asp [https://perma.cc/UZ67-8FW9] [hereinafter ChinaCosta Rica FTA]; China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 166, art. 160(2); Free Trade
Agreement, Costa Rica-Sing., art. 13.1(2), Apr. 6, 2010, https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg//media/esg/files/non-financial-assistance/for-companies/free-tradeagreements/Singapore_Costa_Rica_FTA/Legal_text/Chapter_13_Intellectual_Property_and
_Innovation [https://perma.cc/V9JN-4CKV] [hereinafter Costa Rica-Singapore FTA];
Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-Viet., art. 12.1(c), May 5, 2015, https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/3584/download [https://perma.cc/NHX5-7ST2] [hereinafter Korea-Vietnam
FTA]; Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 2(d); Australia-Hong Kong FTA,
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legitimate interests of . . . the community”234 or “the society” as a
whole,235 or refer to “the public interest” in general.236 The EU-Japan
FTA mentions the need to “tak[e] into account the interests of relevant
stakeholders including right holders and users.”237 More specifically,
the CPTPP acknowledges the countries’ recognition of “the
importance of a rich and accessible public domain.”238
Some particular goals—if truly pursued by the countries—may steer
national IP legislation to set appropriate limits on IP protection. In
general, the EU-Korea FTA, the EU-Singapore FTA, and the
EU-Vietnam FTA refer to the objective of achieving not only an
effective but also an adequate level of protection and enforcement of
IP rights.239
Some FTAs mention among their objectives that national IP laws
promote “social and economic welfare”;240 the EFTA’s FTAs with
Colombia and Peru, the Australia-Peru FTA, the CPTPP, and the
USMCA refer to “a manner conducive to social and economic welfare,
and to a balance of rights and obligations.”241 The CPTPP and the
USMCA recognize that countries may have to adopt “measures
necessary . . . to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance
to
their
socio-economic
and
technological

supra note 67, art. 14.2(1)(d); see also EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162, art. 12.1(2)
(stating that an objective of intellectual property rights is contributing “to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare”).
234. TPSEP, supra note 233, art. 10.2(2); Malaysia-Pakistan FTA, supra note 51, art.
104(2); China-Peru FTA, supra note 51, art. 144(2); China-New Zealand FTA, supra
note 166, art. 160(2); Costa Rica-Singapore FTA, supra note 233, art. 13.1(2); KoreaVietnam FTA, supra note 233, art. 12.1(c).
235. China-Costa Rica FTA, supra note 233, art. 109(2).
236. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 195(b); Georgia-Hong Kong
FTA, supra note 67, art. 2(d); Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.2(d).
237. EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.2.
238. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.15(1).
239. EU-Korea FTA, supra note 170, art. 10.1(b); EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 73,
art. 10.1(1)(b); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162, art. 12.1(1)(b); EU-Moldova FTA,
supra note 69, art. 277(b); EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 157(b).
240. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 195(b); EU-Vietnam FTA,
supra note 162, art. 12.1(2).
241. EFTA-Colombia FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.2(1); EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note 67,
art. 6.2(1); Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.2; CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.2;
USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.2.
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development.”242 The EU-Vietnam FTA includes the goal of
“contributing to a more sustainable and inclusive economy.”243
Some FTAs refer to the objective that national IP laws
“contribute[ . . .] to transfer and dissemination of technology”;244
numerous EU-concluded FTAs refer to the “commercialisation of
innovative and creative products.”245 The EFTA’s FTAs with Colombia
and Peru, the Australia-Peru FTA, the CPTPP, and the USMCA refer
to “the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge.”246 The Australia-Peru FTA, the CPTPP, and the USMCA
also state a need to “facilitate the diffusion of information, knowledge,
technology, culture[,] and the arts.”247
Recently, FTAs have recognized competition and market efficiency
as significant goals that IP laws should support. The Georgia-Hong
Kong FTA and the Australia-Hong Kong FTA mention the IP system’s
“support [of] open, innovative and efficient markets,”248 and, similarly,
the EU-Japan FTA, the Australia-Peru FTA, the CPTPP, and the
USMCA refer in the IP chapter to, among other needs, “the need to . . .
foster competition and open and efficient markets.”249 The
U.K.-CARIFORUM FTA declares the countries’ interest in “foster[ing]
competitiveness . . . and in particular micro-, small and medium-sized
enterprises.”250
Given the insufficient adoption of flexibilities in many countries,251
a reminder of possible flexibilities and a declaration that countries are
242. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.3(1); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.3(1).
243. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162, art. 12.1(1)(a).
244. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 195(b).
245. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162, art. 12.1(1)(a).
246. EFTA-Colombia FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.2(1); EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note 67,
art. 6.2(1); Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.2; CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.2;
USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.2.
247. Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.4(b); CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.4;
USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.4(b).
248. Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 2(d); Australia-Hong Kong FTA,
supra note 67, art. 14.2(1)(d).
249. EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.2(c); Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67,
art. 17.4(c); CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.4(c); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.4(c).
250. Economic Partnership Agreement Between the CARIFORUM States, of the
One Part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the
Other Part, art. 132(b), Mar. 22, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/803413/1._CARIFOR
UM_Command_Paper_Part_One.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQT2-6BPF] [hereinafter
U.K.-CARIFORUM FTA].
251. See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.

2022]

UNJUSTLY VILIFIED TRIPS-PLUS?

1503

expected to make use of flexibilities are useful components of FTAs.
An affirmation of countries’ options to utilize flexibilities appears in
numerous FTAs that specifically point to the principles of IP legislation
included in TRIPS Article 8(1), which mentions the use of exceptions
and flexibilities for adopting “measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition.”252 The CPTPP and the USMCA reassure
countries that the FTAs “do[] not reduce or extend the scope of
applicability of the limitations and exceptions permitted by the TRIPS
Agreement, the Berne Convention, and the WCT[,] or the WPPT.”253
Some FTAs mention that countries may utilize flexibilities to reflect
the circumstances of the digital environment.254 There are even
references to concrete flexibilities in some FTAs, such as the reference
in a footnote in the CPTPP that explains that if a country protects
copyright for more than the life of the author plus seventy years, the
country may apply the rule of the shorter term under the Berne
Convention.255
FTAs can pay particular attention to public health and access to
medicines, which were subject to the Doha Round and the resulting
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“the
Declaration”).256 The Australia-Peru FTA, the CPTPP, and the USMCA
include a separate article with “[u]nderstandings [r]egarding
[c]ertain [p]ublic [h]ealth [m]easures” and repeat much of the
language from the Declaration.257 These FTAs declare that the
obligations in the FTA IP chapters “do not and should not prevent a
[country] from taking measures to protect public health”;258 therefore,
the chapters should be “interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of each [country’s] right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”259 The FTAs state
252. Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-Peru., art. 17.4(5), Mar. 21, 2011 [hereinafter
Korea-Peru FTA].
253. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.65(2); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.64(2).
254. TPSEP, supra note 233, art. 10.3(4).
255. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.63, n.75.
256. WORLD TRADE ORG. MINISTERIAL CONF., Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (adopted Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm [https://perma.cc/X5Y3-R66Z].
257. Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.6; CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.6;
USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.6.
258. Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.6(a); CPTPP, supra note 66, art.
18.6(a); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.6(a).
259. Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.6(a); CPTPP, supra note 66, art.
18.6(a); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.6(a).
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that the countries should enter into consultations about any
amendments that might be necessitated by a waiver or amendment of
any TRIPS provision.260 Concerns about public health have also found
expression in other FTAs; provisions on “Patents and Public Health”
appear in the Costa Rica-Singapore FTA,261 and provisions on
“Intellectual Property and Public Health” are in several FTAs that
China and Hong Kong have concluded.262
In some instances, a clarification of a TRIPS requirement may lead
to an increase in IP protection,263 but in other instances, a clarification
may assist in limiting IP protection increases. An FTA provision that
establishes a specific exception or limitation to IP rights within TRIPS
flexibilities may guide countries by clarifying the scope of the
flexibilities and ensuring that countries utilize a particular aspect of
the flexibilities. For example, the CPTPP and the USMCA mandate
that countries “adopt or maintain a regulatory review exception for
pharmaceutical products.”264 The EU-Colombia and Peru FTA
mandates that the countries provide for an exception to trademark
rights that allows “a person to use the trademark where it is necessary
to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular
as accessories or spare parts, provided that it is used in accordance with
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.”265 The
EU-Ukraine FTA lists “[e]xceptions to the restricted acts relating to
computer programs,” which include use by the lawful acquirer for an
intended purpose, “including for error correction,” and the
observation, study, or testing for the purposes of “determin[ing] the
ideas and principles which underlie any element of the programme.”266
The same FTA permits decompilation of a computer program under

260. Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.6(c); CPTPP, supra note 66, art.
18.6(c); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.6(c). The U.S.-concluded FTAs, with the
exception of the USMCA, refer only to a possible amendment to TRIPS and not to a
waiver. Peru-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.13(2)(c); Colombia-U.S. FTA, supra note
67, art. 16.13(2)(c); Panama-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.12(2)(c).
261. Costa Rica-Singapore FTA, supra note 233, art. 13.4.
262. China-Costa Rica FTA, supra note 233, art. 112; Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra
note 67, art. 5; China-Mauritius FTA, supra note 37, art. 10.3; Australia-Hong Kong
FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.4.
263. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
264. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.49; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.47.
265. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 206(2).
266. EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 183(3).
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specific conditions267 and prohibits a right holder from using a
contract to exclude the possibility of the creation of a backup copy.268
To maintain countries’ flexibilities, it is important for any exceptions
and limitations listed in FTAs to be non-exhaustive so that they do not
limit countries’ adoption of additional exceptions and limitations that
are permitted by the flexibilities in multilateral treaties. In its
subsection on trade secrets, the EU-Japan FTA lists conduct that
countries shall not consider as contrary to honest commercial
practices; on the list are independent discovery, reverse engineering,
use required or allowed by law, use by employees, and “disclosure of
information in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and
information.”269 However, the list refers only to the mandatory
exceptions that countries must introduce into their national laws; the
FTA clearly leaves open the option for the countries to implement
additional exceptions.270 The EU-Singapore FTA and the EU-Vietnam
FTA list “the fair use of descriptive terms” as a mandatory exception to
trademark rights, but they also expressly state that countries “may
provide for other limited exceptions” (and repeat TRIPS Article 17
language on the limitations of exceptions).271
An adjustment to the level of IP protection may also occur through
remedies. The EU-CARIFORUM FTA states that countries may “in
appropriate cases and at the request of the [infringer]” allow courts to
“order [only] pecuniary compensation to be paid to the injured
person” “if that person acted unintentionally and without negligence,
if execution of the measures in question would cause him
disproportionate harm and if pecuniary compensation to the injured
party appears reasonably satisfactory.”272 The CAFTA-DR eliminates
damages as a form of remedy in cases of copyright and neighboring
rights infringements by “a nonprofit library, archives, educational
institution, or public broadcasting entity” if these entities are innocent

267. Id. art. 184(1).
268. Id. art. 183(2); see also Ukraine-U.K. FTA, supra note 73, art. 173(2).
269. EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.36(4)(e). The influence of the 2016 EU
Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade
secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure is apparent in the text.
See generally Council Directive 2016/943, 2016 O.J. (L 157) (EU).
270. See Japan-U.K. FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.41(4).
271. EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 73, art. 10.15; EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162,
art. 12.21.
272. EU-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 70, art. 159; EU-Colombia and Peru, supra
note 67, art. 243; EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 195(4).
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infringers.273 The USMCA also limits remedies against such institutions
in cases of violations of technological protection measures and rights
management information.274 In cases of corrective measures, the
EU-Central America FTA allows the countries to enable their courts
“to take into account, inter alia, the gravity of the infringement, as well
as the interests of third parties holding ownership, possessory,
contractual, or secured interests.”275
Some FTAs reinforce the space for exceptions and limitations to IP
rights that are not included in TRIPS. For example, the EU-Colombia
and Peru FTA specifies breeder’s rights as possible exceptions and
limitations.276 The EU-CARIFORUM FTA, the EU-Central America
FTA, and the U.K.-CARIFORUM FTA expressly state that countries
“shall have the right to provide for exceptions to exclusive rights
granted to plant breeders to allow farmers to save, use and exchange
protected farm-saved seed or propagating material.”277
5.

Updating existing TRIPS provisions
FTAs may be useful in updating and clarifying TRIPS;278 if designed
properly, FTAs may “make[ . . . ] the [TRIPS’s] provisions sharper and
more specific.”279 FTAs can reflect the latest technological
developments and clarify TRIPS in order to adjust IP rules to reflect
the developments.280 It is in this category that many disagree about the
positive nature of FTA contributions; for example, the strengthening
of moral rights in the EU and EFTA FTAs might be perceived as
positive by creators and authors but as negative by other

273. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(14).
274. USMCA, supra note 66, 20.81(18)(b).
275. Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Union and Its
Member States, on the One Hand, and Central America on the Other, art. 266(3),
June 29, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L346) 3 [hereinafter EU-Central America FTA].
276. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 232.
277. EU-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 70, art. 149(1); EU-Central America FTA,
supra note 275, art. 259(3); U.K.-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 250, art. 149(1).
278. Correa refers to this category of FTA provisions as “TRIPS-plus.” Correa, supra
note 60, at 181–82.
279. Pedro Roffe, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Protection of Genetic Resources
and Associated Traditional Knowledge, in PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE
WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 303 (Daniel F. Robinson et al. eds,
2017).
280. Yu, supra note 56, at 111–12.
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stakeholders.281 Similarly, stakeholders are likely to disagree about the
benefits of mandatory implementation of the resale right, which some
EU FTAs impose.282 Nonetheless, some updates to TRIPS might be
broadly beneficial.
Some countries have used FTAs to clarify the details of the
protection of geographical indications (GIs). Not surprisingly given its
interest in GIs, the European Union in particular has included
extensive provisions on GIs in some of its FTAs,283 but the USMCA also

281. TRIPS excludes moral rights from the Berne Convention provisions that
TRIPS incorporates, but countries may address moral rights in their FTAs within the
framework left by the Berne Convention and the Beijing Treaty. The EFTA’s FTAs with
Colombia and Peru and the EU-Colombia and Peru FTA reiterate the obligation to
provide for the right of attribution and integrity to authors and performers and a
stipulation of the duration of moral rights “at least until the expiry of the economic
rights.” EFTA-Colombia FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.8(3); EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note
67, art. 6.8(3); EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 216(2). The EFTA’s
FTAs make the rights “exercisable by the persons or institutions authorised by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed.” EFTA-Colombia FTA, supra
note 67, art. 6.8(3); EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.8(3). On the exclusion of
moral rights from the incorporation provision in TRIPS see DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 245–46 (2012).
282. The resale right, which is optional under Berne Article 14, and which remains
optional under TRIPS, is made mandatory in the EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, the EUMoldova FTA, and the EU-Georgia FTA. The right under the FTAs must be
“inalienable and unwaivable” and apply to “all acts of resale made by auction or
through art market professionals, such as salesrooms, art galleries, or other dealers in
works of art.” EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 223; EU-Moldova FTA,
supra note 69, art. 290; EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 163; see also Georgia-U.K.
FTA, supra note 69, art. 155; Ukraine-U.K. FTA, supra note 73, art. 180. Cf. EU-Vietnam
FTA, supra note 162, art. 12.15 (making the introduction of the resale right optional).
Many FTAs include detailed provisions on neighboring rights. EU-Korea FTA, supra
note 170, arts. 10.7–10.9; EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, arts. 155–158; EU-Moldova
FTA, supra note 69, art. 282–285; EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, arts. 14.9–14.12; EU–
Vietnam FTA, supra note 162, arts. 12.7–12.10; USMCA, supra note 66, arts. 20.56–
20.63.
283. For instance, the EU-Ukraine FTA, the EU-Georgia FTA, the EU-Moldova FTA,
and the EU-Vietnam FTA include eleven articles; the EU-Korea FTA, the EU-Central
America FTA, and the EU-Japan FTA nine articles; and the EU-Colombia and Peru
FTA and the EU-Singapore FTA eight articles on geographical indications. EUUkraine FTA, supra note 69, arts. 201–211; EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, arts. 169–
179; EU-Moldova FTA, supra note 69, arts. 296–306; EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162,
arts. 12.23–12.33; EU-Korea FTA, supra note 170, arts. 10.18–10.26; EU-Japan FTA,
supra note 70, arts. 14.22–14.30; EU-Central America FTA, supra note 275, arts. 242–
250; EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, arts. 207–214; EU-Singapore FTA,
supra note 73, arts. 10.16–10.23.
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includes several articles on GIs.284 The FTAs may encompass a broad
scope of clarifications of GI protection: the Eurasian-Vietnam FTA
states that the protection of appellations of origin extends even to
names that do not contain the name of the particular geographical
area.285 The New Zealand-Taiwan FTA recognizes the possibility that
geographical indications may be protected through a trademark
system,286 and lists several possible “grounds for opposing or cancelling
the registration or designation of a geographical indication.”287
According to the CAFTA-DR, the countries must allow persons from
another contracting country to “apply for protection or petition for
recognition of geographical indications” without requiring
“intercession by that [country] on behalf of its persons.”288 Some FTAs
list particular geographical indications that countries must mutually
recognize and agree to protect; examples include Tequila and Mezcal
in the Israel-Mexico FTA,289 and Pisco, Maíz Blanco Gigante Cusco, and
Chulucanas in the Peru-Singapore FTA.290 Some FTAs specifically
284; CPTPP, supra note 66, arts. 18.30–18.36; USMCA, supra note 66, arts. 20.29–
20.35.
285. Free Trade Agreement Between the Eurasian Economic Union and Its
Member States, of the One Part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the Other
Part, 2015, art. 9.8(2), May 29, 2015, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/
ru/act/trade/dotp/sogl_torg/Documents/%D0%92%D1%8C%D0%B5%D1%82%
D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC/EAEU-VN_FTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHD2-EATB]
[hereinafter Eurasian-Vietnam FTA]; see, e.g., Joined Cases C-465/02 & C-466/02, Fed.
Republic of Germany v. Comm’n of the European Cmmtys., 2005 E.C.R. 1-09115.
286. Agreement on Economic Cooperation, N.Z.-Taiwan, ch. 10, art. 7(2), July 10,
2013,
https://www.nzcio.com/assets/NZCIO-documents/ANZTEC-Final-Text-10July-2013-NZ.pdf [https://perma.cc/M69L-BQQD] [hereinafter New Zealand-Taiwan
FTA].
287. Id. art. 7(3).
288. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.3(2).
289. Free Trade Agreement, Isr.-Mex., Annex 2-05(1), Apr. 10, 2000, 2128 U.N.T.S.
3.
290. Free Trade Agreement, Peru-Sing., art. 2.17(2), May 29, 2008,
https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/non-financial-assistance/for-singaporecompanies/free-trade-agreements/ftas/singapore-ftas/pesfta
[https://perma.cc/4RU7-VQNX]; see also Chile-MexicoFTA, supra note 41, arts. 15–24
& Annexes (listing particular geographical indications); Chile-Korea FTA, supra note
51, art. 16.4, Annexes (same); Japan-Mexico FTA, supra note 33, art. 8, Annex 3
(same); TPSEP, supra note 233, art. 10.5, Annex 10.A (same); Free Trade Agreement,
Pan.-Chile, art. 3.12, June 2, 2006, http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/chl_pan
chl_pan_e.asp [https://perma.cc/TT42-TSS5] (same); Chile-Japan FTA, supra note
70, art. 163(1), Annex 15 (same); China-Peru FTA, supra note 51, art. 146, Annex 10
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mention protection of country names against commercial uses that
would likely mislead consumers.291
FTAs may address countries’ approaches to abuses of IP rights and
anti-competitive conduct. No multilateral treaty on competition law has
yet been concluded, and TRIPS addresses anti-competitive practices in
a limited manner. TRIPS Article 40 concerns “anti-competitive practices
in contractual licences” and recognizes countries’ agreement that some
licensing practices or conditions may be anti-competitive and that
countries may act to “prevent or control such practices.”292 The provision
makes it mandatory for countries to cooperate in investigations of such
practices.293 Further, TRIPS mentions anti-competitive practices in Article
31; Article 31 suspends in cases of a patent holder’s anti-competitive
practices some of the conditions for issuing a compulsory license to a
patent.294 Some FTAs include provisions on competition law in general,295
and FTAs may also fill some of the gaps left by TRIPS by adding provisions
concerning anti-competitive conduct that concerns IP rights.
FTAs frequently mention enforcement of IP rights on the internet,
which is a topic that TRIPS did not specifically address.296 Some FTAs
add provisions on intermediary liability, which are discussed in the
following subsection, and some FTAs mention enforcement in the
digital realm. The Canada-Korea FTA requires that the countries adopt
“measures to curtail copyright and related right infringement on the
Internet or other digital network,”297 and the China-Korea FTA refers
to the need to take “effective measures to curtail repetitive infringement
of copyright and related rights on the Internet or other digital

(same); China-Costa Rica FTA, supra note 233, art. 116, Annexes (same); Korea-Peru
FTA, supra note 252, art. 17.6, Annex 17A (same); Costa Rica-Peru FTA, supra note
213, art. 9.4, Annex 9.4 (same); Colombia-Costa Rica FTA, supra note 213, art. 9.4,
Annex 9-A (same); Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.10 (same); EU-Canada
FTA, supra note 51, art. 20.18, Annex 20-A (same); Canada-Ukraine FTA, supra note
70, art. 11.3, Annexes (same).
291. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.18; CPTPP, supra note 66, art.
18.29; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.28.
292. TRIPS, supra note 4, arts. 40(1)–(2).
293. Id. arts. 40(3)–(4).
294. Id. art. 31(k).
295. EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, arts. 203–09.
296. See infra note 385 and accompanying text. On the lack of treatment of internetspecific issues in TRIPS see Marketa Trimble, TRIPS in the Field of Copyright, in THE
FIRST 25 YEARS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT IN CONTEXT 12–13 (Christopher Heath &
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2022).
297. Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.16(4).
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network.”298 The Eurasian-Vietnam FTA stipulates that countries “shall
aim” to effectively protect and enforce copyright and related rights in
“the digital environment.”299 The Canada-Korea FTA article on “special
measures against copyright infringers on the internet” states that the
civil and criminal enforcement procedures outlined in the FTA also
apply to “infringement of copyright or related rights over digital
networks, which may include the unlawful use of means of widespread
distribution for infringing purposes.”300 The Canada-Korea FTA makes
it optional for countries to give their agencies the authority to “order
an online service provider to disclose expeditiously to a right holder
information sufficient to identify a subscriber whose account was
allegedly used for infringement.”301 The Canada-Korea FTA also states
that both countries “shall endeavour to promote cooperative efforts
within the business community to effectively address copyright or
related rights infringement while preserving legitimate competition
and, consistent with that [country’s] domestic law, preserving
fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process,
and privacy.”302
FTAs may reflect countries’ commitment to safeguard fundamental
rights as they embark on enforcement of IP rights on the internet. The
Canada-Ukraine FTA requires the countries to implement measures
against copyright infringers on the internet but do so “in a manner
that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate activity, including
electronic commerce and, consistent with that [country’s] law,
preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair
process, and privacy.”303 The EU-Colombia and Peru FTA refers to the
need to “ensure the free movement of information services.”304
Some FTAs focus on the protection of trade secrets in court
proceedings. TRIPS requires that countries’ civil judicial procedures
to enforce IP rights “provide a means to identify and protect
confidential information,”305 that orders to produce evidence “ensure
the protection of confidential information,”306 and that the right of
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.28 (emphasis added).
Eurasian-Vietnam FTA, supra note 285, art. 9.6(2).
Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.16(1).
Id. art. 16.16(2).
Id. art. 16.16(3).
Canada-Ukraine FTA, supra note 70, art. 11.7(5).
EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 250.
TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 42.
Id. art. 43(1).
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inspection and information in customs proceedings is “[w]ithout
prejudice to the protection of confidential information.”307 The
general transparency obligations in TRIPS Article 63 are subject to
countries’ discretion to withhold information that would “prejudice
the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises,” which
could protect trade secrets;308 the cooperation obligation in
investigations of anti-competitive practices does not concern
confidential information.309 TRIPS also mentions protection of
“manufacturing and business secrets” in its provision concerning
process patents, where it makes mandatory the judicial authority to
order an alleged infringer to prove that the process it is using is
different from the patented process.310 In this context TRIPS says that
“the legitimate interest of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.”311 In
addition to emphasizing TRIPS rules, FTAs may enhance the rules
concerning confidentiality in IP rights proceedings by focusing on the
enforcement of the rules.312 The Canada-Korea FTA, the China-Korea
FTA, the CPTPP, and the USMCA make it mandatory for countries to
make sanctions available for authorities to impose “on a party, counsel,
experts, or other persons subject to the court’s jurisdiction, for
violation of judicial orders concerning the protection of confidential
information produced or exchanged in connection with that
proceeding.”313
FTAs are an opportunity to address remedies. TRIPS includes several
articles concerning remedies,314 but the articles do not cover all aspects
of remedies. Some FTAs address the calculation of damages; the
Australia-Chile FTA requires that courts “consider, inter alia, any
legitimate measure of the value of the infringed goods or services
including the retail price.”315 The CAFTA-DR refers to the
307. Id. art. 57.
308. Id. art. 63(4).
309. Id. art. 40(3).
310. Id. art. 34(3).
311. Id. art. 34(3).
312. Japan-U.K. FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.56(2).
313. Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.13(19); China-Korea FTA, supra note
67, arts. 15.24(8), 20.81(16); CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.74(14); USMCA, supra note
66, art. 20.74(b); see also Australia-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 13.9(11)(b).
314. See TRIPS, supra note 4, arts. 43–49 (covering evidence, injunctions, damages,
other remedies, right of information, indemnification of the defendant, and
administrative procedures).
315. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.36(2)(b).
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consideration of “suggested retail price or other legitimate measure of
value that the right holder presents,”316 and the Canada-Korea FTA
states that the “legitimate measure of value the right holder submits . . .
may include lost profits.”317 The EU-Canada FTA mentions the
possibility for a court to award “a royalty or fee, to compensate a right
holder for the unauthorised use of the right holder’s intellectual
property.”318 The EU-Georgia FTA states that damages should be
“appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered by [the] right holder as
a result of the infringement.”319 The EU-Georgia FTA and the
EU-Singapore FTA mention “lump sum” damages that may be awarded
“on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of royalties or
fees” that the infringer would have been required to pay if the infringer
had obtained authorization from the right holder.320
FTAs may include provisions on statutory damages, which are not
available in all countries and which TRIPS mentions only as an option
in certain cases.321 The CAFTA-DR mandates that countries “establish
or maintain pre-established damages as an alternative to actual
damages”; this obligation applies “at least with respect to civil judicial
proceedings concerning copyright or related rights infringement and
trademark counterfeiting.”322 A similar provision which states that
pre-established damages must be sufficient to meet both the
compensatory and the deterrent functions exists in both the ChinaKorea FTA and the CAFTA-DR.323 The Canada-Korea FTA lists preestablished damages as one of the forms of remedies that must be
available, “[a]t least with respect to infringement of copyright or
related rights protecting works, phonograms, and performances, and
in cases of trademark counterfeiting.”324
Publication of a decision may be a remedy that is available to the
prevailing party. According to the EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, the

316. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(7)(b); accord China-Korea FTA, supra note
67, art. 15.24(2)(b).
317. Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.13(10); accord EU-Canada FTA, supra
note 51, art. 20.40(1)(b).
318. EU-Canada FTA, supra note 51, art. 20.40(2).
319. EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 196(1).
320. Id. art. 196(1)(b); EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 73, art. 10.44(3).
321. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 45(2).
322. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(8).
323. China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.24(3); CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art.
15.11(8).
324. Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.13(12).
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EU-Georgia FTA, and the EU-Moldova FTA the countries must ensure
that their “judicial authorities may order . . . appropriate measures for
the dissemination of the information concerning the decision.”325 Such
dissemination is to be requested by the applicant and ordered at the
expense of the infringer, and it could include “displaying the decision
and publishing it in full or in part.”326 The EU-Central America FTA
says that the countries may “provide for other additional publicity
measures which are appropriate to the particular circumstances,
including prominent advertising.”327
Many FTAs address the issue of costs and fees, which TRIPS
addresses and disposes of in a single paragraph.328 FTAs may require
that judicial authorities have the power to award the prevailing party
court costs and fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees, other than in
exceptional circumstances.329 The EU-Central America FTA, the
EU-Ukraine FTA, the EU-Georgia FTA, and the EU-Moldova FTA refer
to “reasonable and proportionate legal costs and other expenses.”330
The Australia-Chile FTA limits the provision to an order against “the
infringing party,”331 while under the CAFTA-DR, the CPTPP, and the
USMCA, the order may be issued against any “losing party.”332 The
provisions in the Australia-Chile FTA are limited to “civil judicial
proceedings concerning infringement of copyright or related rights or
trade mark counterfeiting”;333 the CAFTA-DR states that reasonable
attorney’s fees may be awarded also in “civil judicial proceedings
concerning patent infringement.”334 Other FTAs extend their
provisions on costs and fees to civil judicial proceedings concerning

325. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 246; EU-Georgia FTA, supra
note 69, art. 198; EU-Moldova FTA, supra note 69, art. 328.
326. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 246; EU-Georgia FTA, supra
note 69, art. 198.
327. EU-Central America FTA, supra note 275, art. 269.
328. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 45(2).
329. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.36(3).
330. EU-Central America FTA, supra note 275, art. 268; EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note
69, art. 241; EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 197; EU-Moldova FTA, supra note 69,
art. 327.
331. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.36(3).
332. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(9); CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.74(10);
see also China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.24(4); EU-Canada FTA, supra note 51,
art. 20.41.
333. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(9); Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136,
art. 17.36(3).
334. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(9).
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infringements of copyright and related rights, patents, and
trademarks,335 and the EU-Canada FTA refers to enforcement of all IP
rights.336
Some countries permit the donation of infringing goods for
charitable causes; typically, the option exists for counterfeit trademark
goods. FTAs may set rules for these donations. According to the
CAFTA-DR, the donation requires an authorization from the right
holder, with the exception of donations made to “charity for use
outside the channels of commerce when the removal of the trademark
eliminates the infringing characteristic of the good and the good is no
longer identifiable with the removed trademark.”337 The EU-Central
America FTA requires an authorization from the right holder or
compliance with other conditions of national legislation.338
TRIPS does not cover alternative dispute resolution, which is
mentioned in the Korea-U.S. FTA, the Australia-Korea FTA, and the
China-Korea FTA. These FTAs state that each country “may permit use
of alternative dispute resolution procedures to resolve civil disputes
concerning intellectual property rights.”339 The 2020 Japan-U.K. FTA
mentions the need to have effective alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms as one of the means of ensuring access to justice for right
holders.340
The TRIPS’s article on criminal procedures341 is enhanced by some
FTAs, typically by enlarging the scope of acts that should be punishable
as crimes, but other FTA provisions on criminal enforcement exist as
well. The EU-Korea FTA requires that the countries adopt measures
necessary to establish the criminal liability of legal persons, at least in
cases of willful trademark counterfeiting and copyright and related
rights piracy that occur on a commercial scale,342 and the FTA also

335. Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.13(14); China-Korea FTA, supra note
67, art. 15.24(4); CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.74(10).
336. EU-Canada FTA, supra note 51, art. 20.41.
337. CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(11)(c).
338. EU-Central America FTA, supra note 275, art. 266(2).
339. Korea-U.S. FTA, supra note 56, art. 18.10(16); Australia-Korea FTA, supra note
67, art. 13.9(15); China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.24(9).
340. Japan-U.K. FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.55.
341. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 61.
342. EU-Korea FTA, supra note 170, art. 10.56(1).
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requires the countries to extend criminal liability to acts of aiding and
abetting the criminal activity.343
FTAs may also promote the exchange of information on
enforcement.344 For example, according to the Malaysia-New Zealand
FTA, the countries should exchange information about IP rights
enforcement through a “designated Contact Point.”345 Canada and
Ukraine have agreed to “endeavour to exchange information and
share best practices in areas of mutual interest relating to the
enforcement” of IP rights and have committed to “cooperate . . . [to]
better identify and target the inspection of shipments suspected of
containing certain counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright.”346 The
Chile-Japan FTA includes a general obligation to make available to the
public “information on [the country’s] efforts to provide effective
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”347 Some FTAs have
recognized the importance of collecting and analyzing statistical data
on infringements and enforcement.348
6.

Matters not addressed in TRIPS
The scope of TRIPS is significant, but TRIPS was not intended to be
exhaustive in either its scope or depth. The non-exhaustive nature of
TRIPS was inevitable; as Taubman recalls, in TRIPS negotiations, as in
other international law negotiations, “‘constructive ambiguity’ [was]
necessary to forge a delicate and finely balanced agreement.”349 With
fewer countries involved in FTAs, the need for “constructive
ambiguity” decreases and the possibilities for agreement increase. A
greater level of agreement can result in FTAs expanding the depth of
TRIPS provisions, and FTAs can also often complement TRIPS by
adding matters not addressed by TRIPS. Even such provisions have the
potential to be positive TRIPS-plus developments, as this Subsection
suggests.350

343. Id. art. 10.57; see also Japan-U.K. FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.58(5); USMCA,
supra note 66, art. 20.84(5).
344. For FTA provisions on information sharing in general see infra Section III.B.8.
345. Malaysia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 137, art. 11.5(a).
346. Canada-Ukraine FTA, supra note 70, art. 11.9(2)–(3).
347. Chile-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 160.
348. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.73(2).
349. Taubman, supra note 62, at 41.
350. Correa refers to these provisions as “TRIPS-extra.” See supra note 114.
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a. Genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore
Some FTA additions are beneficial because they reflect countries’
recognition of the importance of the additions for either themselves
or their FTA counterparties. The IP negotiation landscape has
changed since TRIPs; many countries now have experience and have
found their voice in international IP negotiations, and FTAs have
begun to represent the diverse perspectives of a greater variety of
countries.351
Among the interests of particular concern to many developing
countries is the protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge,
and folklore.352 During the TRIPS negotiations some countries
proposed that protection for traditional knowledge be included in
TRIPS, but Paul Kuruk blames on “the erratic and inconclusive nature
of the proceedings at the conference [that] these proposals were given
rather short shrift and no specific actions were ever taken with regard
to them.”353 On the one hand, the inclusion of the matters in FTAs is
beneficial because the inclusion moves FTA countries toward mutual
goals in the absence of an agreement at the multilateral level.354 On
the other hand, the inclusion of the matters in FTAs can be
problematic because FTAs can, if not drafted carefully, complicate or
even impede future multilateral agreements on these matters.
Concern about the protection of traditional knowledge and genetic
resources is particularly apparent in the FTAs that have been
concluded by some Latin American countries,355 but the concern is not
unique to Latin American countries. By now, many FTAs include some
provisions concerning genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and
351. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 311, 313 (2011) (“[E]xamining the performance of
less developed countries at various stages of development of [TRIPS].”).
352. See, e.g., Roffe, supra note 279, at 303 (discussing the recent “receptiveness to
some of the concerns raised by developing countries multilaterally”).
353. Paul Kuruk, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, GENETIC RESOURCES, CUSTOMARY LAW
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A GLOBAL PRIMER 60 (2020).
354. For multilateral negotiations see the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.
Intergovernmental
Committee
(IGC),
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc [https://perma.cc/TH5L-A7DE].
355. Roffe, supra note 279, at 304 (noting that “[w]hile genetic resources and
associated traditional knowledge were not finally incorporated in the IP chapters
concluded between the US and [Colombia, Panama, and Peru], these are the subject
of specific annexes in the form of side letters that gave credit to the significance of
these issues particularly for the demandeur countries”).
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folklore.356 These provisions may be located in the FTA section on the
environment357 or on the protection of biodiversity, or both.358 Some
countries’ views on the form of protection and the content of
protection are influenced by their adherence to related treaties,
particularly the Convention on Biological Diversity359 and its Nagoya
Protocol.360
Even general recognition of the gravity of the concerns about
traditional knowledge and genetic resources can be regarded as
progress. For instance, in the EU-Central America FTA, the countries
“recognise the importance of respecting, preserving and maintaining
the indigenous and local communities’ knowledge, innovations and

356. TPSEP, supra note 233, art. 10.3(3)(d); see also China-Costa Rica FTA, supra
note 233, art. 111 (including provisions on “Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore”); China-Georgia FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.16 (same); Costa
Rica-Singapore FTA, supra note 233, art. 13.3 (same); China-New Zealand FTA, supra
note 166, art. 165 (same); Australia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 14.12 (same);
Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, ch. 11, art. 16 (same); Closer Economic
Partnership Agreement, H.K.-N.Z., Mar. 29, 2010, https://mfatgovtnz
2020.cwp.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/Hong-Kong-China-CEP/NZ-HK-CEP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CR35-ECE5] [hereinafter Hong Kong-New Zealand FTA] (same);
Korea-New Zealand FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.10, (same); China-Peru FTA, supra note
51, art. 145 (same); EU-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 70, art. 150 (same); New
Zealand-Taiwan FTA, supra note 286, ch. 10, art. 6 (same); China-Korea FTA, supra
note 67, art. 15.17 (same); Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.17 (same);
Korea-Peru FTA, supra note 252, art. 17.5 (including a provision on “Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge”); Malaysia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 137,
art. 11.6 (including a provision on “Traditional Knowledge”).
357. Roffe, supra note 279, at 305.
358. E.g., provisions entitled “Measures Related to Biodiversity” in EFTA-Colombia
FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.5; EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.5; see also provisions
entitled “Measures Related to the Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional
Knowledge” in Colombia-Costa Rica FTA, supra note 213, art. 9.5; Costa Rica-Peru FTA,
supra note 213, art. 9.5; and provisions entitled “Protection of Biodiversity and
Traditional Knowledge” in EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 201.
359. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993), https://www.cbd.int/convention/text.
360. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, U.N.T.S. No. A-30619, https://www.cbd.int/abs/text. For an
example of FTA provisions influenced by the obligations from the multilateral treaties
see Tratado de Libre Comercio [Free Trade Agreement], Pan.-Peru, art. 9.6(4)–(5),
May 25, 2011, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/PAN_PER_FTA_s/PAN_PER_
ToC_s.asp#PDF [https://perma.cc/R4JZ-WSDG] [hereinafter Panama-Peru FTA].
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practices that involve traditional practices related to the preservation
and the sustainable use of biological diversity.”361
The Panama-Taiwan FTA and the Nicaragua-Taiwan FTA include
three articles on “collective rights, protection of folklore and genetic
resources.”362 These FTAs mandate the countries’ protection of the
rights through “a special sui generis intellectual property registration
system,”363 and the FTAs list the forms of traditional expressions that
the countries must recognize as part of their indigenous peoples’
heritage, including customs, religiosity, and cosmos vision.364 The
countries must protect this heritage from attempts by third parties to
monopolize the objects of the heritage but must allow the peoples to
“authorize third parties to make use of such heritage, in the
understanding that this shall not be an exclusive right.”365
Provisions on genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore
also appear in the EU-Ukraine FTA, in which the countries agree, for
example, to “promote [a] wider application [of knowledge,
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities] with
the involvement and approval of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge, innovations
and practices.”366
How genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore should
be protected has been disputed in multilateral negotiations. The EUUkraine FTA includes an agreement by the parties to “continue
working towards the development of internationally agreed sui generis
models for the legal protection of traditional knowledge,”367 suggesting
the parties’ preference for the creation of a new sui generis type of
protection, as opposed to extending the existing IP protection to
genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore. The AustraliaPeru FTA avoids controversy concerning the form of protection and
refers to the countries’ “continuing commitment to working towards a
361. EU-Central America FTA, supra note 275, art. 229(5).
362. Nicaragua-Taiwan FTA, supra note 67, arts. 17.17–17.19; see also Free Trade
Agreement, Pan.-Taiwan, arts. 16.05–16.07, Aug. 21, 2003, https://rtais.wto.org/
rtadocs/425/TOA/English/Panama-Chinese%20Taipei%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7PL-XU2P].
363. Nicaragua-Taiwan FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.17(2).
364. Id. art. 17.17(3).
365. Id. art. 17.17(4).
366. EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 229(1).
367. Id. art. 229(2); see also U.K.-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 250, art. 150(2).
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multilateral outcome on [IP]” through their participation in
negotiations in WIPO.368
The relationship between traditional knowledge and genetic
resources on the one hand and patent protection on the other hand
has been a controversial point in multilateral negotiations. In the
Korea-Peru FTA, the countries pledge to “seek ways to share
information on patent applications based on genetic resources or
traditional knowledge”; they also promise to provide “opportunities to
file prior art to the appropriate examining authority in writing.”369 In
the EFTA’s FTAs with Colombia and Peru the countries went as far as
setting a procedural minimum that mandates that patent applicants
include in their applications “a declaration of the origin or source of a
genetic resource, to which the inventor or the patent applicant has had
access.”370 Countries may also require “the fulfilment of prior informed
consent.”371 According to the Panama-Peru FTA, if national law so
requires, patent applicants must demonstrate that they had “legal
access” to any “biological [and] genetic resources and/or associated
traditional knowledge” and disclose the origin of the resources or
knowledge.372 The Australia-Peru FTA and the CPTPP state that
“quality patent examination” may include taking into account
“relevant publicly available documented information related to
traditional knowledge,” “an opportunity for third parties to cite . . .
prior art,” and “the use of databases and digital libraries containing
traditional knowledge.”373
b. Collective management of copyright
An area that TRIPS does not address is the collective management
of copyright; this area is also missing from subsequent WIPO treaties.374

368. Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.18(2).
369. Korea-Peru FTA, supra note 252, art. 17.5(4)(b).
370. EFTA-Colombia FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.5(5); EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note 67,
art. 6.5(5).
371. EFTA-Colombia FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.5(5); EFTA-Peru FTA, supra note 67,
art. 6.5(5).
372. Panama-Peru FTA, supra note 360, art. 9.6(8).
373. Australia-Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.16(2)(a)–(c); CPTPP, supra note 66,
art. 18.16(3)(a)–(c).
374. EU directives address aspects of collective management of copyright. See
Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial
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FTAs may focus on the establishment of collective management bodies
in the countries and safeguarding the basic principles of their
operation. Some FTAs include countries’ commitments to “foster the
establishment of appropriate bodies for the collective management of
copyright and encourage such bodies to operate in a manner that is
efficient, publicly transparent and accountable to their members.”375
In the EU-Japan FTA the countries “agree to promote the
transparency of collective management organisations” and “endeavour
to facilitate non-discriminating treatment . . . of right holders.”376 The
EU-Ukraine FTA recognizes “the need for [the countries’] respective
collecting societies [to] achieve a high level of rationalisation and
transparency with respect to the execution of their tasks.”377
Some FTAs address the distribution of royalties through collective
management bodies. In the Korea-Peru FTA the countries agree to
endeavor to promote the activities of collective management
associations of copyrights and related rights for the effective
distribution of royalties, so that they may be fair and proportional to
the use of the works, performances, phonograms, or broadcasts of
the right holders of the Parties, in a transparent and good business
practices frame, in accordance with their domestic legislation.378

The EU-Colombia and Peru FTA formulates the need for “an
equitable distribution of remunerations collected, which are
proportional to the utilization of the works, performances or
phonograms, in a context of transparency and good management
practices.”379 The EU-CARIFORUM FTA mentions, in the context of
collective management of copyright, the goal of an adequate reward to
right holders for the use of their content.380 The CPTPP and the

licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, 2014 O.J. (L
84) 72; Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market, art. 12, 2019
O.J. (L130) 92 [hereinafter DSM Directive].
375. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, supra note 39, ch. 13 art. 5(1)(c); see also
Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.19; China-Georgia FTA, supra note 67, art.
11.15; Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 15; Australia-Hong Kong FTA,
supra note 67, art. 14.14(1); Australia-Malaysia FTA, supra note 68, art. 13.13.
376. EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.16.
377. EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 168; see also Ukraine-U.K. FTA, supra note
73, art. 158 (including the same language).
378. Korea-Peru FTA, supra note 252, art. 17.7(9).
379. EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, art. 217.
380. EU-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 70, art. 143(B); see also U.K.-CARIFORUM
FTA, supra note 250, art. 143 (using language similar to the EU-CARIFORUM FTA).

2022]

UNJUSTLY VILIFIED TRIPS-PLUS?

1521

USMCA state that practices must be “fair, efficient, transparent and
accountable,” and mention in particular “appropriate record keeping
and reporting mechanisms.”381
Some FTAs also focus on cross-border cooperation among collective
management organizations. In the EU-CARIFORUM FTA the
countries are committed to “facilitate the establishment of
arrangements between their respective collecting societies with the
purpose of mutually ensuring easier access to and delivery of licences
for the use of content at the regional level throughout the territories
of the [countries].”382 The EU-Central America FTA recognizes “the
importance of . . . the establishment of arrangements between them,
with the purpose of mutually ensuring easier access and delivery of
content between the territories of the Parties, and the achievement of
a high level of development with regard to the execution of their
tasks.”383 The EU-Georgia FTA lists as the purpose of the cooperation
between their collective management societies the “promoting [of] the
availability of works and other protected subject matter and the
transfer[ing] of royalties for the use of such works or other protected
subject matter.”384
c. Internet service providers
Online enforcement and internet service provider (ISP) liability are
missing from TRIPS, which did not consider copyright issues raised by
the internet.385 The new “digital agenda” was considered during the
negotiations of subsequent WIPO treaties, but ISP liability was also not
included in those treaties notwithstanding the fact that the treaties
took the internet and some associated IP-related issues into account.
The absence of provisions on ISP liability in the WIPO treaties is not
surprising; current discussions within individual countries, including

381. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.70; USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.68.
382. EU-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 70, art. 143(B).
383. EU-Central America FTA, supra note 275, art. 236.
384. EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 164; see also EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note
69, art. 168; Korea-Vietnam FTA, supra note 233, art. 12.8(4)(same); Singapore-Turkey
FTA, supra note 73, art. 15.6 (same).
385. See, e.g., Lars Anell, Keynote Speech at the TRIPS Symposium, 26 February 2015, in
THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS 365–68 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015).
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the United States and the countries of the European Union,
demonstrate the complexity of these questions.386
While FTAs provide an opportunity for countries to agree on rules
on ISP liability, what these rules should be is a matter of fierce debate
in countries domestically, and also in the European Union, where the
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market awaits its full
implementation in the individual EU member states while it is at the
same time attacked in the Court of Justice of the European Union.387
Finding a common language on ISP liability might be difficult if not
impossible, and any common language will undoubtedly not please all
stakeholders.
Some FTAs draw at least the contours of ISP liability regulation. The
Australia-Chile FTA requires the countries to “limit remedies that may
be available against service providers for infringement of copyright or
related rights that they do not control, initiate or direct and that take
place through their systems or networks.”388 The FTA includes further
details, such as the rough outline of a notice and takedown or a notice
and notice system.389 The Australia-China FTA expressly permits
countries to
take appropriate measures to limit the liability of, or remedies
available against, internet service providers for copyright
infringement by the users of their online services or facilities, where
the internet service providers take action to prevent access to the
materials infringing copyright in accordance with the laws and
regulations of the [country].390

386. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis, & Brianna Schofield, Notice &
Takedown: Online Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC ’Y 371, 373–74 (2017); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF ., SECTION 512 OF TITLE
17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2020), https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf.
387. DSM Directive, supra note 374; Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Guidance on Article 17
of Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, COM(2021) 288 final (June 4, 2021); Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland
v. European Parliament and Council, 2019 O.J. (C 270) 21; see also Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for
Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, COM(2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
388. Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.40(1).
389. Id. art. 17.40(2).
390. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.20.
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Other FTAs include provisions on ISP liability that go into
significantly greater detail;391 these provisions bear the clear imprint of
the law in the particular FTA countries. The provisions in
EU-concluded FTAs resemble the EU Electronic Commerce Directive
and its provisions on “[liability] of intermediary service providers,”392
and U.S.-concluded FTAs resemble the provisions on safe harbor for
service providers in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.393 The
adoption of either model in FTAs is problematic because of the
ongoing discussions about the suitability of the models; currently,
general provisions in FTAs may be more beneficial than a
transplantation of any particular national model.
d. Internet domain names
TRIPS does not address internet domain names. The regulation of
the domain name system (DNS) through national laws is complicated.
The DNS was not established under any national law and has been
governed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) with limited government intervention.
Nevertheless, even the ICANN dispute resolution policy accounts for
influences from national laws, which have, to a various degree, affected
the functioning of the DNS.394
Some FTAs declare only generally countries’ interest in the domain
name space. The 2003 Australia-Singapore FTA includes a general
obligation for countries to “monitor and support . . . endeavours to

391. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.11(27); EU-Korea FTA, supra note 170,
arts. 10.62–10.66; EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, arts. 244–249; EU-Canada FTA,
supra note 51, art. 20.11; CPTPP, supra note 66, Section J & Annexes (noting Annex
18-F directs the Parties to the Chile-U.S. FTA as a method of implementation);
USMCA, supra note 66, arts. 20.87–88 & Annex to Section J.
392. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce),
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, § 4; EU-Korea FTA, supra note 170, arts. 10.62–10.66; EUColombia and Peru FTA, supra note 67, arts. 250–54.
393. 17 U.S.C. § 512; Chile-U.S. FTA, supra note 56, art. 17.11(23); Singapore-U.S.
FTA, supra note 73, art. 16.9(22); USMCA, supra note 66, arts. 20.86–20.88.
394. Uniform Domain Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN (Aug. 26, 1999)
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en [hereinafter UDRP];
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 621,
625 (4th Cir. 2003); see Marketa Trimble, Territorialization of the Internet Domain Name
System, 45 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 623, 644–50 (2018) (analyzing the effects of national law
on the UDRP law and process).
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develop international policy or guidelines governing the resolution of
disputes relating to domain names.”395 The 2003 Singapore-U.S. FTA
states that the countries shall participate in ICANN’s Governmental
Advisory Committee.396
The provisions in FTAs that concern the DNS in greater detail
pertain to countries’ country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs);397
these are the domains over which countries exercise some degree of
power because of their governments’ involvement in the delegation
and maintenance of ccTLDs.398 Several FTAs mandate the adoption of
“an appropriate procedure for the settlement of disputes” concerning
their respective ccTLDs; the procedure should be based on the
principles in ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy (UDRP).399 The same FTAs also call for “online public access to
a reliable and accurate database” of domain-name registration
information that respects countries’ laws concerning personal data
protection.400
The CPTPP and the USMCA include a more lengthy provision on
domain names that recognizes the possibility that the dispute
395. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Sing., ch. 13, art. 15, Feb. 17, 2003,
https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/safta/officialdocuments/Pages/default.
396. Singapore-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 16.3(1).
397. “A country code top level domain [is] assigned according to the two-letter
codes in the ISO 3166 standard codes for the representation of names of countries or
territories.” ccTLD Constituency Best Practices Guidelines for ccTLD Managers, ICANN (Mar.
10, 2001), https://archive.icann.org/en/cctlds/cctldconst-4th-best-practices-10mar01.htm.
398. See Delegating or Transferring a Country-code Top-level Domain (ccTLD), IANA,
https://www.iana.org/help/cctld-delegation (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
399. Singapore-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 16.3(2); Australia-U.S. FTA, supra note
73, art. 17.3(1); CAFTA-DR, supra note 67, art. 15.4(1); Bahrain-U.S. FTA, supra note
66, art. 14.3(1); Korea-U.S. FTA, supra note 56, art. 18.3(1); Australia-Chile FTA, supra
note 136, art. 17.24(1); Australia-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 13.4(1); Morocco-U.S.
FTA, supra note 66, art. 15.4(1); Colombia-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.4(1); PeruU.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.4(1); Oman-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.3(1);
Nicaragua-Taiwan FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.12; Panama-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art.
15.4(1); see also UDRP, supra note 394.
400. Singapore-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 16.3(2); Chile-U.S. FTA, supra note 56,
art. 17.3(2); Australia-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 17.3(2); CAFTA-DR, supra note 67,
art. 15.4(2); Bahrain-U.S. FTA, supra note 66, art. 14.3(2); Korea-U.S. FTA, supra note
56, art. 18.3(2); Australia-Chile FTA, supra note 136, art. 17.24(2); Australia-Korea
FTA, supra note 67, art. 13.4(2); Morocco-U.S. FTA, supra note 66, art. 15.4(2);
Colombia-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 16.4(2); Peru-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art.
16.4(2); Oman-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.3(2); Panama-U.S. FTA, supra note 67,
art. 15.4(2).
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resolution mechanism may be either modeled after the ICANN UDRP
or designed separately, but in the latter case, the CPTPP and USMCA
specify the requirements of the design: expeditious dispute resolution
that “is fair and equitable,” that “is not overly burdensome,” that does
not preclude the option to go to court, and that is available at a low
cost.401 As opposed to earlier FTAs, the CPTPP and the USMCA also
address substantive law. They follow UDRP language in their
provisions that require that appropriate remedies be made available at
least in cases when a registrant has registered or holds a domain name
that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark and has done so
with a bad faith intent to profit.402
e. Utility models
Some FTAs include provisions on utility models. The Paris
Convention covers utility models, but TRIPS does not contain any
provision concerning them. Countries that have utility model
protection can use FTAs to find compatibilities between utility model
protection and similar protections offered in other FTA countries, or
at least to educate other countries about utility model protection.403
Some FTAs simply extend all or some of their general IP-related
provisions to utility models, which is consistent with the Paris
Convention’s inclusion of utility models in the definition of industrial
property.404 The EU-CARIFORUM FTA includes utility models in its
definition of IP rights and contains special provisions on utility
models—which specify requirements for protection, possible
exception to protectability, and term of protection—and details the
relationship between utility model protection and patent protection.405
The provision has been replicated in the U.K.-CARIFORUM FTA.406
401. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.28(1)(a); USMCA, supra note 66, art.
20.27(1)(a).
402. CPTPP, supra note 66, art. 18.28(2); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.27(1)(b).
403. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Legal Framework for the
Protection of Utility Models, 4 WIPO J. 175, 176–85 (2013)(discussing the treatment of
utility models in the Paris Convention, TRIPS, and FTAs).
404. Japan-Thailand FTA, supra note 216, arts. 126(3), 127(a), 140(1), 140(4); EUUkraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 230(1) (including utility models in the definition of
IP rights); EU-Georgia FTA, supra note 69, art. 190(1); (same); TEEU, supra note 38,
art. 12.43(1); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 162, art. 12.43, para. 1 n.65; (sames);
Ukraine-U.K. FTA, supra note 73, art. 220(1) (same); see also Paris Convention, supra
note 45, art. 1(2).
405. EU-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 70, art. 148.
406. U.K.-CARIFORUM FTA, supra note 250, art. 148.
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China and Korea have included utility models in their FTA’s
definition of IP rights407 and also agreed on an article specifically about
utility models, in which they express their desire to enhance their
cooperation in this area “by exchanging information and experience
on laws and regulations concerning utility model[s].”408 In cases where
the countries’ agencies do not conduct substantive examinations of
utility models, the FTA allows courts to require that the complainant
submit “an evaluation report made by the competent authority based
on a result of prior art searches.”409
7.

Experimentation
In their substance and processes of their negotiation, adoption, and
implementation, FTAs present a useful opportunity to experiment.
Countries may have problems negotiating and adopting FTA
provisions at the multilateral level when the provisions do not reflect
their individual policies, their stage of development, or for some other
reasons. Bilateral or regional negotiations might be more conducive to
agreement and allow experimentation in a smaller bilateral or regional
setting. Critics argue that resorting to bilateral and regional
agreements contributes to the fragmentation of international IP law;410
however, even some of the critics admit that there are certain benefits
in this fragmentation, particularly insofar as it permits
experimentation.411
International law can benefit from experimentation at a smaller
than multilateral scale. If a provision is successful in two or a small
number of FTA countries, the provision might later be introduced in
a multilateral setting where lessons from the bilateral or regional
experiment might be valuable. Engelhardt noted that the European
Union has used bilateral and regional negotiations “as a ‘stepping
stone’ for further negotiations in multilateral fora,”412 and Roffe
suggested that “[d]evelopments of this type could set important
precedents and thus establish state practices that one day could find a
place in international law.”413

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

China-Korea FTA, supra note 67, art. 15.2(2).
Id. art. 15.16(1).
Id. art. 15.16(2).
See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 62, at 146–47.
Engelhardt, supra note 97, at 782.
Roffe, supra note 279, at 314.
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National law can benefit from experimentation in FTAs as well.
Experimentation can provide opportunities to explore forms of
cross-border cooperation; cross-border measures are unlikely to
emerge through unilateral actions, and such measures benefit from
international cooperation and international instruments. FTAs may
suggest areas where experimentation within an FTA country could be
pursued, without necessarily mandating that countries adopt the
experiment. For example, the Korea-Vietnam FTA permits the
countries to provide for accelerated examinations of patent
applications as an incentive to patent working.414 Countries also use
FTAs to promote the interests of their nationals in other FTA
countries; because IP treaties operate on the basis of the principle of
national treatment, countries cannot (with few exceptions)415 rely on
the principle of reciprocity to incentivize other countries to match the
former countries’ IP standards.
Kennedy highlighted an FTA function that is often overlooked; he
concluded that “FTAs have delivered results through negotiation that
could not have been obtained through TRIPS dispute settlement.”416
He has observed “a close relationship between the contents of US FTAs
and the issues covered in the USTR’s Special 301 reports,”417 which
express the United States’ displeasure with other countries’ IP
enforcement and policies. This perspective gives FTA experimentation
yet another meaning; it is an alternative to escalating the relations
between and among countries.418 Critics might doubt this
“peacekeeping” function of FTAs given the power imbalance that
exists between or among countries in many FTA negotiations.
However, weaker countries might not fare better in dispute resolution
processes based on multilateral treaties if the countries are
disadvantaged in the processes by a lack of legal expertise and fewer
resources in general.
Critics have rightly warned that, rather than providing space for
experimentation, FTAs can narrow or eliminate the space if they limit

414. Korea-Vietnam FTA, supra note 233, art. 12.7(5).
415. See Berne Convention, supra note 45, arts. 14ter(2), 7(8) (exceptions to the
principle of national treatment being reciprocity in the case of the resale right and the
rule of the shorter term); TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 3(2) (exceptions for aspects of
judicial and administrative procedures).
416. KENNEDY, supra note 56, at 99.
417. Id. at 99.
418. Id. at 100 (“FTAs can create an alternative avenue for dispute settlement.”).
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countries’ abilities to take advantage of the flexibilities in TRIPS.419
Countries need to be aware of the effects that FTAs can have on future
negotiations, whether they are developed, developing, or least-developed
countries. Even a developed country can be locked in bilateral IP
commitments that the country must extend to all WTO countries because
of most-favored-nation treatment, and that might be difficult to change
in, or coordinate with, future instruments.
Critics have pointed out that bilateral and regional settings make it
easier for developed countries and powerful stakeholders to exert
pressure on developing countries; they argue that multilateral fora
make it easier for countries to resist the pressure.420 Reichman argues
that “[i]n multilateral forums . . . no single cohort of special interests
can readily impose its will on the assembly as a whole without deep and
significant compromises on all sides.”421 Whether multilateral fora
protect countries from lobbying pressures is debatable; industry
pressures are not reduced when negotiations are multilateral, and the
pressures may be greater when a country’s vote can be decisive in a
multilateral setting, particularly when international bodies act through
consensus, as has been the informal practice in the WIPO Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights.422
8.

Increased mutual understanding
The process of FTA negotiations provides an educational
opportunity; through negotiations countries can improve their
knowledge of each other’s legal systems and practice, interests, and
concerns. Much learning occurs in multilateral settings; WIPO is an
important venue for recurring interaction among national IP law
experts and diplomatic representatives who might be aware of IP
matters. Countries enhance their understanding of each other’s
positions through repeat interactions, active participation in meetings,
and contributions to documents. However, interactions in large
multilateral settings cannot match the intense experience of bilateral
and regional negotiations, particularly if national IP experts are
419. See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 79–84, 93–95 and accompanying text.
421. Reichman, supra note 79, at 83; see also Cottier & Foltea, supra note 52, at 164
(observing that “[t]he declination of IPR structure pairings in multilateral, bilateral
and plurilateral fora allow the conclusion to be drawn that the fora of negotiations
truly matter in terms of achieving an appropriate balance of rights and obligations”).
422. Cf. Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR), WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/policy/en/sccr [https://perma.cc/FX9S-2X86].
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involved and interact directly during negotiations. The smaller setting
can be more conducive to effective information gathering and mutual
learning about each other’s IP law systems. Negotiators benefit from a
greater awareness of IP issues and the greater IP law expertise of their
negotiating partners.
Critics argue that FTA negotiations have limited, if any, educational
value because they perpetuate the practice of IP negotiations being
conducted by trade law experts rather than IP law experts. Without the
right experts at the table, both international negotiations and mutual
learning suffer, and a key opportunity is missed to build stronger ties
among the countries.
The educational objectives have found expression in FTA provisions
that pledge countries’ readiness to learn and share information about
each other’s legal systems. Many FTAs include provisions on the future
exchange of information and cooperation.423 Some FTAs specify
learning goals; for example, the EU-Chile FTA covers technical
cooperation in the form of legislative advice, mentioning specifically
the “comments on draft laws relating to the general provisions and
basic principles of the international conventions” and “advice on the
ways of organising administrative infrastructure, such as patent offices
and collecting societies.”424
To keep an FTA partner updated, countries agree on mutual
notifications on new IP legislation and other IP law-related
developments.425 For example, in several FTAs, New Zealand and its
partners agreed to notify each other not only about any new IP
legislation, but also about other developments in IP enforcement and
IP policy.426 The European Union and Korea, the European Union and
Ukraine, and Mexico and Panama agreed to exchange information not
only about “the legal framework concerning [IP] rights” but also about

423. Free Trade Agreement, Chile-Turk., art. 35(5)(b), July 14, 2009,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CHL_TUR_Final/Text_FTA_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WDT2-XH3Y].
424. EU-Chile FTA, supra note 169, art. 32(2).
425. E.g., China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 166, art. 163(a); Malaysia-New
Zealand FTA, supra note 137, art. 11.4(2)(a) (same); Korea-New Zealand FTA, supra
note 67, art. 11.8(1)(a) (same).
426. China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 166, art. 163(b); Malaysia-New Zealand
FTA, supra note 137, art. 11.4(2)(b).
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“experiences on legislative progress.”427 Technical and capacity-building
cooperation also appears in FTAs. For example, the Singapore-Turkey
FTA mentions cooperation as to “management, licensing, valuation and
exploitation of [IP] rights; technology and market intelligence;
facilitation of industry collaborations . . .; and public private partnerships
to support culture and innovation.”428
Countries may agree in FTAs to cooperate in international
negotiations; natural and formal alliances have emerged in WIPO, and
FTAs can strengthen the existing alliances or form new alliances.429 For
example, China and New Zealand have agreed to “exchange
information regarding enhancement of intellectual property rights
enforcement and related initiatives in multilateral and regional
fora.”430 The Chile-China FTA sets up “notification of policy dialogue
on initiatives on intellectual property in multilateral and regional
fora,”431 and the China-Switzerland FTA mentions the “exchange of
information relating to . . . activities in international organisations.”432
The Japan-Switzerland FTA and the EU-Japan FTA commit the parties
to cooperate on, among other things, the exchange of information
about the countries’ relations with third countries as regards IP
matters;433 this exchange of information could help the countries map
the complex web of bilateral and regional obligations that the
countries enter into.
Specific areas of interest that are mentioned in FTAs signal the
countries’ priorities for the future. Traditional knowledge, genetic
427. EU-Korea FTA, supra note 170, art. 10.69(1); EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69,
art. 230(1); see also Tratado de Libre Comercio [Free Trade Agreement], Mex.-Pan.,
art. 15.11(2)(a), Apr. 3, 2014, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/panama-tpa/final-text [https://perma.cc/MLL3-8WRG].
428. Singapore-Turkey FTA, supra note 73, art. 15.24(1)(e).
429. In WIPO, countries coordinate within various groups, such as the Asia and the
Pacific Group, BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa),
GRULAC (the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries), and CACEEC (the
Group of Central Asian, Caucasus and Eastern European Countries). General Statements
by Delegations, Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, Sixty-First Series of Meetings, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., (Sept. 2020), https://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/statements.jsp
[https://perma.cc/GV2C-6QP6].
430. China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 166, art. 163(d); see also Malaysia-New
Zealand FTA, supra note 137, art. 11.4(2)(b) (including a provision covering “policy
dialogue on initiatives for the improvement of enforcement of intellectual property
rights in multilateral and regional fora”).
431. Chile-China FTA, supra note 173, art. 111(2)(d).
432. China-Switzerland FTA, supra note 67, art. 11.4(c).
433. Japan-Switzerland FTA, supra note 73, art. 14.52(1).
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resources, and folklore are among these foci; for example, China and
Peru have agreed to exchange information on “internal procedures
regarding sharing equitable benefits arising from the use of genetic
resources, traditional knowledge, innovations and practices.”434 New
Zealand and Thailand mention these as areas for “enhanced
understanding” and recognize that in these areas the countries “may
wish, consistent with [their] obligations under the WTO Agreement,
to establish appropriate measures.”435 The Australia-China FTA
recognizes the opportunity to “establish appropriate measures” in
these areas and commits the parties to further discussions of the
areas.436 The Korea-Peru FTA is more specific about the countries’
collaboration; it states that the countries agree to “share views and
information on discussions in the WIPO Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore, the WTO TRIPS Council, and
any other relevant fora in addressing matters related to genetic
resources and traditional knowledge.”437
FTAs may enumerate other areas for future collaboration: customs
procedures are mentioned as an area of cooperation and exchange of
information in the Brunei-Japan FTA, which specifically lists
“enforcement against the trafficking of prohibited goods and the
importation and exportation of goods suspected of infringing
intellectual property rights.”438 Some FTAs that China has concluded
mention the exhaustion of patent rights as a point for future
discussion; although the FTAs recognize that the countries are free to
determine the conditions of IP rights exhaustion, the FTAs
nevertheless flag patent exhaustion.439 The Australia-China FTA
includes the countries’ pledge to “contribut[e] to the reform and
further development of the international plant breeders’ rights laws,
standards and practices, including within the South East Asian
region.”440 The EU-Ukraine FTA notes the countries’ preference for
sui generis protection for genetic resources, traditional knowledge,
and folklore, and includes a pledge by the countries to “regularly
434. China-Peru FTA, supra note 51, art. 148.
435. New-Zealand-Thailand FTA, supra note 51, art. 12.5(1)(d).
436. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.17.
437. Korea-Peru FTA, supra note 252, art. 17.5(5).
438. Brunei-Japan FTA, supra note 167, art. 53(1).
439. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.8; see also China-Georgia FTA,
supra note 67, art. 11.6; Georgia-Hong Kong FTA, supra note 67, art. 6.
440. Australia-China FTA, supra note 161, art. 11.16(c).
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exchange views and information on relevant multilateral discussions”
on this subject.441
Some FTAs with detailed IP chapters establish a committee or
subcommittee designed to oversee the implementation and operation
of the IP chapter.442 The committee has general functions, such as
“reviewing and monitoring” the implementation of the chapter,
enhancing IP protection and enforcement, and promoting the
efficient administration of IP systems, and it may also have specific
assignments, such as the EU-Japan FTA IP committee that performs
certain tasks concerning geographical indications.443 The EU-Korea
FTA establishes a separate Working Group on Geographical
Indications “for the purpose of intensifying cooperation between the
[countries] and dialogue on geographical indications”;444 in the
EU-Ukraine and the EU-Moldova FTAs the titles of the bodies are the
Sub-Committee on Geographical Indications and the Geographical
Indications Sub-Committee, respectively.445 The role of the committees
may be problematic, but as long as their competences are
appropriately constrained, they may contribute to the educational
value of FTAs.446
9.

Incentives to calibrate
FTA negotiations at the bilateral or regional level and the
subsequent process of implementation at the national levels provide
incentives to calibrate national IP systems to the FTAs. Because IP law
operates within a larger national legal system, its components should

441. EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 229; see also supra Section III.B.6.a.
442. E.g., Nicaragua-Taiwan FTA, supra note 67, art. 17.06; Australia-Korea FTA,
supra note 67, art. 13.12 (same); Australia-Japan FTA, supra note 202, art. 16.21 (same);
Agreement for an Economic Partnership, Japan-Mong., art. 12.18, Feb. 10, 2015,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067716.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MYW8-42L5]
(same); USMCA, supra note 66, art. 20.14 (same).
443. EU-Japan FTA, supra note 70, art. 14.53(2).
444. EU-Korea FTA, supra note 170, art. 10.25(1).
445. EU-Ukraine FTA, supra note 69, art. 211; EU-Moldova FTA, supra note 69, art.
306.
446. But see Wolfgang Weiß, Joint Organs in EU Free Trade Agreements as a Threat to
Democracy, in THE CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
222–23 (Isabelle Bosse-Platière & Cécile Rapoport eds., 2019) (noting in the context
of European Union’s FTAs that “[t]he amount and extent of [the committees’]
competences may threaten democracy as the Committees exercise public powers that
go beyond mere executive implementation, without sufficient parliamentary
control”).
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be calibrated to achieve a country’s IP policy objectives. International
law obligations, including obligations stemming from an FTA, may
require implementation into national laws, but such implementation
may distort the equilibrium of a national IP system.
Equilibrium in a national IP system should be maintained and
restored with each significant change; the equilibrium requires a
recalibration that considers not only particular IP law components that
are being amended to comply with an FTA but also other elements of
the national legal system.447 Frankel suggests that TRIPS-plus
requirements might create a strong impetus to calibrate national IP
systems, particularly when the requirements are for stronger IP
protection; according to Frankel, “[a]s stronger intellectual property
norms proliferate[,] the incentive for domestic calibration becomes
even greater.”448
In some countries, an FTA might precipitate useful openings in the
national legislative process. National negotiators could hope that a new
FTA would not require changes to their national laws and therefore
not create a danger of undesirable changes to the laws. But a
disadvantage to one is an opportunity to others, and sometimes an FTA
forces a valuable opening in a national law, inviting positive
reassessment and positive changes to the law.449
Ideally, the process of calibration would start much earlier.
Anderson and Razavi note that “developing countries owe themselves
and the system the benefit of a hard look, including a cost-benefit
analysis before any agreement is reached or negotiated.”450 Indeed, the
perspectives of the developing and least-developed countries have
often been missing from international negotiations, impoverishing the
negotiations of a plenitude of policy considerations from which all
countries could benefit.
Ex ante analyses contribute to the shaping of all countries’
negotiation positions that best comply with their calibration plans. The
process and outcome of negotiations will often require changes to
plans, but all changes may benefit from analyses that were conducted
in preparation for negotiations. Ex ante analyses and sufficient

447.
448.
449.
450.

See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 118, at 502–04.
Frankel, supra note 71, at 104.
See supra Section III.A.
Anderson & Razavi, supra note 74, at 291 (emphasis added).
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planning can alleviate some of the concerns over democratic deficit
and transparency in FTA negotiations.451
CONCLUSIONS
Bilateral and regional treaties, including FTAs, can move
international law forward and can do so in a productive and beneficial
manner. When countries reach a point in multilateral negotiations
where they cannot, or do not want to, compromise, their negotiators
may exclude a matter from a proposed instrument, they may treat a
matter at a higher, acceptable level, or they may consciously introduce
some degree of ambiguity into the treatment of the matter to ease the
implementation of the instrument in the negotiating countries.
Because of the smaller number of participating countries, bilateral and
regional negotiations enable negotiators to explore controversial
points and attempt greater agreement on difficult points. Negotiators
may include previously excluded matters, reach deeper into details
that multilateral instruments have omitted, and clarify ambiguities that
multilateral instruments have left unresolved.
When TRIPS was concluded, it was a benchmark of countries’
agreement on international IP law in the multilateral setting. With one
exception,452 TRIPS has remained a static instrument that does not,
and cannot, reflect the evolution of national IP laws and current
thinking about IP law. Nor does TRIPS reflect that there are parties to
TRIPS that can agree on more points than any multilateral setting
permits. FTAs give countries the possibility of success at a smaller-thanmultilateral scale, which may benefit a variety of stakeholders—not
only IP rights holders.
Existing FTAs should not be idealized; they are a compromise that
favors stronger parties over weaker ones. IP law provisions, negotiated
as a lesser part of a larger treaty, can be an area where weaker parties
accept significant compromises in order to achieve their trade
objectives. Nor should there be unreasonable expectations of a
stronger country; as much as one might wish otherwise, no country
should be expected to place the universal global good before its own
good. If a country has IP laws that were adopted by a democratically
elected legislature, the country’s negotiators cannot be expected to do
less than promote the country’s own IP law on the international stage.
451. For concerns over democratic deficit and transparency see supra notes 78, 91,
92 and accompanying text.
452. TRIPS, supra note 4, Article 31bis.

2022]

UNJUSTLY VILIFIED TRIPS-PLUS?

1535

Any deviations from the national law in the negotiators’ positions,
unless pre-approved by the national legislature, are an attempt at
changing national law through undemocratic means—by forcing a
change onto the legislature as a fait accompli. The replication of a
country’s own national law in an FTA is also desirable because the
principle of reciprocity is absent from most international IP law, and
therefore only the exportation of a country’s own law into other
countries ensures that the country’s nationals will benefit from the
same national law in the other countries.
Proponents, and even some critics of FTAs, have observed the
beneficial aspects of TRIPS-plus provisions.453 Whether there is a
benefit, and how much benefit countries have gained or may gain from
TRIPS-plus depends on perspective, and no uniform perspective, or
even a single perspective for one country, exists. Issues and positions
have advantages and disadvantages, and international negotiations are
as much about convincing one’s counterparties to abandon certain
positions as they are about pursuing domestic desiderata.
The review of FTA provisions and features in this Article highlights
the aspects of FTAs that can be useful elements in future negotiations.
Some FTA provisions that seem to be mere treaty “fillers” to some
countries may be significant negotiating points to other countries;
regardless of a country’s perspective, negotiations on even the most
banal provisions can contribute to a building of mutual trust and
respect in international IP law and form the basis for more advanced
future negotiations.

453. Yu, supra note 56, at 113 (“As much as policymakers and commentators are
eager to criticize the deleterious effects of the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements, we cannot lose sight of the
Agreements’ positive benefits.”).

